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In this Note, the author examines measures recently enacted by New
Hampshire and Vermont in response to judicial mandatesfor education reform. By implementing district reform measures in demographicallysimilar
environments, the reform efforts of these two statesprovide a valuableperspective from which to examine the debate surroundingeducationfinance reform. Evaluatingthe experiences of these two New Englandstates, as well as
those of other states committed to educationfinance reform, the authorcontends that successful reform measures must incorporateelements of both equity and adequacy. Specifically, the author proposes that both states'
implementation of a statewideproperty tax is aprogressivestep toward equality in education andfairness in taxation. The authorconcludes that a state
committed to school finance reforms that are both fair and effective should
expand revenue sources in order to arriveat per-pupil expendituresthat will
ensure equity and adequacy.
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INTRODUCTION

In Brown v. Board of Education,' Chief Justice Warren declared,

"[i] t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 2 While the
immediate response to Brown was the racial desegregation of American public schools, the spirit of Brown manifests itself today in the
effort to effectuate economic desegregation. 3 For the last thirty years,
state supreme courts have interpreted state constitutions to require
state education systems to meet basic requirements of adequacy, equity, or both. 4 Thus, "where the state has undertaken to provide it,"
education "is a right which must be made available on equal terms."5
Consequently, it is unconstitutional for a state to delegate its responsi-

bility to local districts when those districts vary greatly in their ability
to finance adequate public education. 6 Because every state except Ha-

l

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.
3 See Elinor Burkett, Don't Tread on My Tax Rate N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 26,1996, § 6 (Maga.
zine), at 42.
4 Nearly every state has faced a challenge to the constitutionality of its education
finance system in the last thirty years. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal.
1976) ("Serrano II") (analyzing the school finance system under strict scrutiny because
"education is a fundamental interest"); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977)
("Horton I") ("[I]n light of the Connecticut constitutional recognition of the right to education it is, in Connecticut, a 'fundamental' right." (internal citation omitted)); Claremont
Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) ("Claremont II") ("We hold that
in this State a constitutionally adequate public education is a fundamental right."); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 394 (Vt. 1997) ("The courts of this state have been no less
forthright in declaring education to be a fundamental obligation of the state."); Scott v.
Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) ("In sum, we agree with the trial court that
education is a fundamental right under the [state] Constitution."); Pauley v. Kelly, 255
S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (noting that language in the state constitution "demonstrates that education is a fundamental constitutional right in this State"); Washakle
County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980) ("In light of the
emphasis which the Wyoming Constitution places on education, there is no room for any
conclusion but that education for the children of Wyoming is a matter of fundamental
interest.").
5 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493; see also Mildred Wigfall Robinson, FinancingAdequateEduca.
tional Opportunity, 14J.L. & POL. 483, 484-85 (1998) ("The Brown opinion is both an eloquent expression of the importance of education and an unreserved reaffirmation of the
state's commitment to providing all children equal educational opportunity.").
6 Since 1976, courts in twenty states have held state education systems to be unconstitutional under state constitution equal protection clauses or education clauses or both,
with some state supreme courts ruling on the validity of the education system multiple
times. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, No. 338, 624 -So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); Roosevelt
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); DuPree v. Alma Sch.
Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal, 1976) ("Serrano II"); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) ("Horton I"); Idaho Schs, for
Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993), Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
State, 512 N.W.2d 787 (Iowa 1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993);
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), amended by Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
2
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wail relies on local school districts to some extent,7 judicial declarations of the state's ultimate responsibility for education have catalyzed
dramatic changes in how states ensure their citizens' fundamental
right to education. Indeed, reform inspired by state supreme court
demands for economic equality in education have been as controversial 8-and as essential to the American ideals of democracy and equality-as the reform the Brown Court mandated.
New Hampshire and Vermont, two states that have recently responded to judicial mandates for educational reform, 9 are fascinating
case studies of the controversies surrounding education finance reform, particularly when compared to one another. Looking at policy
and results in these two states in tandem is productive for three reasons. First, both states implemented reform during approximately the
same time frame (1997 to 1999) and with the same information milable to each in terms of the experiences of and lessons to be learned
from other states. Second, because both states are overwhelmingly
white and therefore racially homogenous, the aspect of race-based inequality is largely eliminated from the equation, allowing for the isolation of economic inequality.' 0 Third, because both states are
comparable in their population profiles-largely rural with smaller,
metropolitan centers"-aspects of inequality associated with populaGovernor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Abbott ex re. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J.
1990) ("Abbott I"); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 511 N.W 2d 247 (N.D. 1994);
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851
S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W2d 391 (rex.
1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d
71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist.
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
7 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 483 n.4.
8 E-g., Editorial, The night
for a Sound Education, N.Y. TMs, Sept. 11, 2000, at A24
(arguing that state court rulings demanding education reform have "revealed a disturbing
hypocrisy among state officials, who trumpet the need for high standards but have tended
to defend mediocrity and inequality in court when their systems are challenged").
9 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) ('Claremont II");
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
10 In 1995, both New Hampshire and Vermont, along with Maine, had nonwhite,
non-Hispanic populations of 2%, the lowest among all states, and Hispanic populations of
1%, as low as any state. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUc. STATI Tics, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., STAT
INDICATORs IN EDUCATION 1997, at 35 (1997).
11 The United States Census Bureau lists greater Burlington, Vermont as a New England County Metropolitan Area with a 1998 population of 154,442. U.S. CENScs Bunnv,
NEv ENGLAND COUNrI MTOPoLrrAw AREA AND CEnRAL Crn' Poputxnox ESTmTES
(1999), at http://wvv.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-ity/ma98.09.LXt (revised
May 15, 2000) [hereinafter NEv ENGLAND CotNxr MErR POITAN AREA PoPutLAvoN Esr.
.MATEs]. This accounts for 26% of Vermont's total population in 1998. U.S. C.,sus BREAU, STATE POPULATION ESTIMATES AND DEM-OGRAPHIC CONEO.FNTS OF POPULATION
CHANGE (1999), at http://v.census.gov/population/estimates/state/st9-l.Lxt (released Dec. 29, 1999) [hereinafter STATE POPULATION FSTIMATES] (reporting Vermont's

population in 1998 as 590,579). The Census Bureau lists four cities in New HampshireManchester, Nashua, Portsmouth, and Rochester-as part of the greater Boston, New En-
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don distribution also do not distort the picture. In sum, these states
provide a unique and valuable controlled "laboratory" environment in
which to examine education finance reform.
In response to the mandates of their respective state supreme
courts, these tiny New England states are now attempting to dismantle
their own version of segregation-of the "haves" from the "havenots' 2-by undertaking bold reform. Although both states undertook this reform by converting some local property tax to statewide
property tax and equally distributing the revenue to pupils statewide,
the states' approaches differ in significant respects.15 It is because of
these differences that comparison of these otherwise nearly mirrorimage states is fruitful. The major point of contrast is in the states'
prioritization of equity among pupils in terms of spending, versus adequacy of education in terms of quality. Vermont's approach is equitydriven, 14 with financial penalties, called recapture, imposed on any
school district that raises money in order to allot funds to education
beyond the statewide per-pupil amount. 15 Significant protest has resulted. Declaring the "Robin Hood" tactics of diverting revenues from
wealthy districts to poorer districts to be unconstitutional in and of
themselves, many Vermonters found the scheme to be offensive to
traditional Yankee values of individualism and local control.' 6 By contrast, New Hampshire's approach is adequacy-driven. New Hampshire
calculates a minimum state subsidy deemed "adequate" but does not
obstruct the efforts of local districts to raise funds in excess of that
17
amount.
This Note proposes that implementation of a statewide property
tax in Vermont and New Hampshire is a progressive step toward
equality in education and fairness in taxation. This Note further argues that limiting the spending in wealthier districts, as Vermont has
done, is a necessary component of equity-driven reform. However,
this Note cautions that the increased per-pupil expenditure generated
by Vermont's equity-conscious system does not ensure that the system
will provide adequacy. Ultimately, this Note concludes that any state
gland County Metropolitan Area. Their respective 1998 populations of 102,524, 82,169,
25,388, and 27,869, Nav ENGLAND COUNTy METROPOIrAN AREA POPULATION ESTIMATES,
supra, account for 20% of New Hampshire's 1998 population, STATE PoPUATIoN EsT.
MArss, supra (reporting New Hampshire's population in 1998 as 1,185,823).
12 Carey Goldberg, School Tax Law Splits 'Haves' and Have Nots,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
1997, at A34.
13 See infra Part Ill.
14 See infra Part III.B.1.
15 See infra Part III.B.1 (b).
16 See Burkett, supranote 3, at 43; Tamala M. Edwards, Revolt of the Gentry: In Vermont a
New Law Meant to Equalize Public School FundingHas Set Off a Ferocious Class War, TIM,June
15, 1998, at 34; Goldberg, supra note 12, at A34.
17 See infra Part III.A.
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looking to reform education finance in the name of fairness, including New Hampshire and Vermont, should look to expand revenue
sources in order to arrive at per-pupil expenditures that will ensure
equity and adequacy.
This Note also examines how New Hampshire and Vermont
could benefit from education finance legislation undertaken in sister
states, which serve as models to states undertaking education reform
legislation.' 8 This Note further explores how examination of the experiences of other states' reform efforts helps to build on and contextualize the experiences of Vermont and New Hampshire. For
example, Texas has experimented with more publicly acceptable alternatives to recapture' 9 that generate the same financial effects sought
by reform in New Hampshire and Vermont. Accountability and as21
20
sessment measures such as those in Kentucky and Massachusetts
also provide valuable lessons for New Hampshire and Vermont.
Part I of this Note describes how school districts with low property

tax bases, which consequently must tax at higher rates to generate as
much revenue as districts with more property wealth, have brought
equal protection or education clause claims in state courts. This section also describes the history of education litigation in New Hampshire and Vermont, as well as the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
decision to overturn the state's education finance system on the basis
18 Education finance reform is a topic visited and continuously revisited in all states.
Many state legislatures have pending or recently enacted legislation affecting the generation and distribution of education funds. See, ag., Act of Apr. 10, 2000, 2000 Colo. Legis.
Serv. ch. 107 (West 2000) (providing for new assessment plan under which the state reviews schools failing to meet state standards and may recommend district reorganization,
curriculum reform, and reallocation of funds); A Plus Education Reform Act, 2000 Ga.
Laws 685 (proposing, among comprehensive reform, adjustment to the equalized yield
formula); Act of May 25, 2000, 2000 Mont. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 11 (proposing to reduce
local property taxes by increasing state funding for education); H.B. 1, 1999 Leg., 140th
Gen. Assem. 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 1999) (proposing to distribute S17.5 million dollars to
enable school districts to reduce property taxes).
Furthermore, education finance continues to be a political issue in many states. Eg,
Randy Ludlow, Teachers Union: Revamp Property Tax Ensure QualiV, Moonqy Says, Cxcl xxrx
Posr, Aug. 30, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 23839257 (reporting teachers union president's
call for the Ohio state legislature to enact a statewide property tax); Stephen Ohlemacher,
GovernorDoubtsSchools Can Share Taxes on Business CEExms%'tD PLUN DL., Aug. 26, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 5162367 (reporting Ohio governor's disfavor of a state%%ide property
tax). Even in states that have enacted a statewide property tax to support education to
some degree, debate continues over its magnitude and implementation. Fg., Editorial,
Daley Talks Property Tax Reform, CM. TmB.,July 24,2000, at 14, availableat 2000 WL 3698641
(noting Chicago mayor's attempt at statewide property tax reform);Jim Sullinger, MusilAd
Steps UpAttack on Ilne Radio Spot Dealsuith School Funding,K,%,. Crn' StARJuly 15, 2000, at
Bi, availableat 2000 WL 7738054 (reporting on the race between Kansas Republican congressional candidates and their disagreement over stateide property tax rate).
19 See infra Part 1.A4.
20 See infra Part II.B.1.
21 See infra Part II.B.2.
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of the New Hampshire Constitution's education clause 22 and the Vermont Supreme Court's invalidation of that state's system on the basis
of the Vermont Constitution's equal protection clause.23 Part II describes and evaluates various components of legislative remedies implemented in other states, including the equity-based remedies in
states like Texas and California and adequacy-based remedies in states
like Kentucky and Massachusetts. Part III describes and compares reform efforts in New Hampshire and Vermont. Part IV makes suggestions for further reform based on the experiences of Vermont, New
Hampshire, and other states.
I
EDUCATION FINANCE LITIGATION

To understand the national trends in education finance reform,
one must examine the litigation that has driven it. This Part examines
the origins of education finance litigation, first in federal courts and
then in state courts. Next, it considers state court claims brought
under the equal protection clauses of state constitutions. Then, it
contrasts these claims with state court claims brought under education
clauses of state constitutions. Finally, it provides background on education reform litigation in New Hampshire and Vermont specifically.
A.

Early Federal and State Court Litigation

Litigation surrounding the adequacy and equality of education
and education finance began with the stirring words of Chief Justice
Warren in Brown v. Board of Education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments.... It is the very foundation of good citizenship.... [I] t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. 24
With this statement, the Court seemingly opened the door for plaintiffs to challenge the constitutionality of their state education finance
systems by objecting to disparities in educational opportunity.2 However, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,2 6 the first
See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) ("Claremont 1I").
See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
SeeJay P. Heubert, Six Law-Driven School Reforms: Developments, Lessons, and Prospects,
in LAW AND SCHOOL REFo c: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PRoMoTING EDUCATIONAL EQuALITY 1, 2
22
23
24
25

(Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999).

26 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The plaintiff school district challenged Texas's adequacy-based
system of funding education, which consisted of a guaranteed minimum amount of resources according to the number of students in the district. See id. at 45. The state contrib-
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challenge to a state's education finance system to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, a five-to-four majority closed the doors of federal courthouses to plaintiffs seeking to reform state education finance systems.
After deciding that education is not a fundamental right - 7 and that
the petitioner school district with a low property-tax base was not a
suspect class based on the factor of "wealth,"28 the Court denied that
the plaintiff's claim warranted strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 29
Following Rodriguez, plaintiffs in education finance reform litigation had no choice but to assert their claims under state constitutions.
3 led the secTwo early cases, Serrano v. Priest3" and Robinson v. Cahils,
3
2
ond wave of education finance litigation. In both cases, state supreme courts overturned state education finance plans that relied
heavily on property taxes, but did so on very different grounds from

each other. The California Supreme Court in Serrano Hf struck down
the system based on the equal protection clause of the California Constitution, 33 holding both that education is a fundamental right and
that poor school districts are a suspect classification.3 4 In contrast, the
uted 80% of this amount and required districts to raise property taxes to supply the
remainder, while allowing districts to supplement this amount with additional property tax
revenue. Id. at 9-10, 46. Typical of most plaintiffs in school finance litigation, the
Edgewood school district had a low property base, so that even when applying high tax
rates, it could only generate a fraction of the funds that wealthier districts could supply
using lower tax rates. Cf id. at 46 (noting that, under the then-current Texas system,
"[t]he greatest interdistrict disparities... are attributable to differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district" and that "[t]hose districts that have more
property, or more valuable property, have a greater capability for supplementing state
funds").
27 Id. at 35-37. The Court rejected the petitioner's claim that education is a fundamental right because it effectuates the First Amendment right to free speech and the right
to make an informed vote. Id. The Court explained that: "we have never presumed to
possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective
speech or the most informed electoral choice." Id. at 36.
28
See i. at 28 (characterizing the plaintiffs as a "large, diverse, and amorphous class,
unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable
wealth than other districts"). The Court denied that such a class met requirements for
strict scrutiny.
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of
the indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
29

Id. at 37-39.

30

487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) ("Serrano 1"). This case, decided prior to Roddgtz, was

reaffirmed in Serrano v. Pries; 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) ("Serrano II").
3'

303 A.2d 273 (NJ. 1973).

Deborah A. Verstegen, The New Wahve of SchoolFinanceLitigation, Pm DELTA KIPP.A,
Nov. 1994, at 243, 244.
33
CA. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
34 SerranoHI,557 P.2d at 951.
32
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New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson based its holding on the state

constitution's education clause, which requires a "thorough and efficient system of free public schools." 35 On this basis, the court held
that the state failed to satisfy its constitutional duty of providing an

adequate public education system.3 6 Taken together, Serrano II and
Robinson demonstrate (1) that education finance litigation can succeed in state courts; and (2) that courts may evaluate education funding systems on two different grounds-adequacy and equity.

B. Litigation Based on Equal Protection Claims
Most post-Serrano 1 state equal protection litigation focused on

correcting inequality in education resulting from the combination of
state and local tax systems funding state public education systems.3 7
Whereas California continued to strictly scrutinize its funding system
in Serrano

bama,4 2
35

IIA3

courts in Wyoming,3 9 Connecticut, 40 Arkansas, 4 1 Ala-

North Dakota, 43 and Vermont 4 4 have used varying levels of

NJ. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, ci. 1.
Robinson, 303 A.3d at 295. Specifically, the court applied a balancing test to the
state school finance system. See id. at 282. The benefits of local control the state achieved
by relying heavily on the local property tax system weighed heavily in favor of its position.
See id. at 286. But on the plaintiffs side, the court interpreted the constitutional mandate
for a "thorough and efficient system of free public schools" as the functional equivalent of
equal educational opportunity. The court declared the current property tax system unconstitutional because it contained "no apparent relation to the mandate for equal educational opportunity." 1d. at 296.
37 SeeJulie K. Underwood, School FinanceAdequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MicH. JL.
RProam 493, 498-500 (1995).
38
See Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 615 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Serrano III") (upholding California's revised system under equal protection strict scrutiny and calling existing disparities in per-pupil spending "both insignificant and justified by legitimate state
interests").
39
See, e.g., Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 340 (Wyo.
1980) (invalidating Wyoming's education finance system as violative of both the equal protection clause and the education clause of the Wyoming Constitution).
40
See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977) ("Horton 1") ("[I]n
Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of
that right must be strictly scrutinized.").
41
See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90,93 (Ark. 1983) (determining that the right to equal educational opportunity is "basic to our society" and that the tax
system bore "no rational relationship to the educational needs of the individual districts,
[but rather that the system] is determined primarily by the tax base of each district").
42
See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 156 (Ala. 1993) (holding
that "the Alabama system of public schools fails to provide plaintiffs the equal protection of
the laws under any standard of equal protection review").
43 See, e.g., Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 259 (N.D. 1994)
(finding that the property tax-based system did not deprive plaintiffs of their fundamental
right to education and using intermediate scrutiny to find the system "not necessarily related to any aspect of educational needs" and that it "fails to bear a close correspondence
either to the constitutional mandate to provide an equal educational opportunity, or to the
legislative goal of 'support[ing] elementary and secondary education in this state from
36
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scrutiny to overturn education finance system on equal protection
grounds.

Courts examining education finance systems on equal protection

grounds must determine what component of the system to equalize.
Commonly, equal protection plaintiffs seek to equalize a system's "inputs," or general per-pupil spending, regardless of special needs.45
Thus, plaintiffs bringing equal protection claims urge courts to require districts to tax property at similar rates and to generate similar
amounts of per-student revenue.
A majority of courts, however, have been reluctant to strike down
entire education funding systems on the basis of inequity alone and
have used both equal protection and education dauses of state constitutions to invalidate education finance systems. 48 Additionally, some
courts have upheld education finance systems by rejecting interpreta-

tions of equal protection clauses that mandate absolute equality in education. 4 7 Other courts have determined that equal protection

state funds based on the educational cost per [pupil].'" (quoting N.D. CENTr. CODE § 1540.1-06(1) (1993))).
44
See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 396 (Vt. 1997) (finding the state education
finance system capricious even under the rational basis test).
45
See; eg., Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 608 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Serrano 111").
46
See, ag., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist.No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 814 (Ariz.

1994) (noting that "[flunding mechanisms that provide sufficient funds to educate children substantially on equal terms tend to satisfy the general and uniform requirement"
and holding that Arizona's then-current education finance system did "not satisi the constitutional mandate of a general and uniform school system"); Abbott cc ret Abbott v.
Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 580-81 (N.J. 1994) (invalidating education finance system that faled
to provide additional funding to special-needs districts on the grounds that it failed to
meet the state education clause mandate for a thorough and efficient education); Pauley'v
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (using both the equal protection clause and the
education clause of the West Virginia Constitution to overturn state education finance system largely relying on local property tax revenues); see also Robert M. Jensen, Advancing
Education Through Education Clauses of State Constitutions,BYU Eotc. & LJ., Spring 1997, at
1, 12-14 (noting the difficulties confronting plaintiffs challenging systems on equality
grounds alone).
47
See, ag., Lujan v. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1022 (Colo. 1982) ("The Colorado Constitution does not forbid disparities in wealth, nor does it forbid persons residing
in one district from taxing themselves at a rate higher than persons in another district.");
Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 653 (Idaho 1975) ("Neither equal protection, nor
[the state constitution education clause], require that the public schools be financed so
that equal amounts are expended per pupil.... ."); Gould v. Orr, 506 NAV.2d 349, 353
(Neb. 1993) (upholding summaryjudgment against equal protection plaintiffs that alleged
disparity in funding but not inadequacy in education); Britt v. State Bd. of Educ., 357
S.E.2d 432, 436 (N.C. 1987) (refusing to interpret the state constitutional mandate that
"equal opportunities shall be provided for all students" as providing a fundamental right to
substantially equal funding (quoting N.C. Co-sr. art. IX, § 2, cl. 1)); Danson v. Casey; 399
A.2d 360, 366-67 (Pa. 1979) (finding no requirement in the Pennsylvania Constitution's
equal protection clause that educational offerings be uniform).
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clauses of state constitutions do not require equality in educational
48
opportunities.
C. Litigation Based on Education Clauses in State Constitutions
Unlike the federal Constitution, every state constitution contains
an education clause. However, these clauses vary in language from
state to state. 49 Over half of the education clauses in state constitutions mandate a threshold level of educational quality. 50 Several of
these clauses use more expansive qualitative language to prioritize education 51 or to further specify the standard the state must meet. Some
clauses specifically identify subjects on which the state education system should focus. 52 Fifteen state constitutions contain clauses emphasizing the purpose and importance of education.5 3 Some
constitutions also include specific provisions for nondiscrimination,
54
accessibility, and uniformity.
48 McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 (Ga. 1981) (recognizing that "iifn terms
of equalization the system is a poor one" but upholding it against equal protection challenge); Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363 (N.Y.
1982) (upholding the school finance system even after admitting it had "significant inequalities"); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969, 973-76 (Sup.
Ct. 1991) (recognizing that the plaintiffs had "vividly demonstrated the disparities in expenditures per pupil between property-wealthy and property-poor districts" but rejecting
their claim for failure to show "gross and glaring inadequacy" in the quality of education
provided), affd as modified, 655 N.E. 2d 647 (N.Y. 1995); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116, 117 n.2, 121-22 (Or. 1991) (holding that clause of the state
constitution requiring "uniform" public schools countenances disparities between districts
with respect to financial benefits and tax burdens).
49
See Daniel D. McClain, Education, Developments in State ConstitutionalLaw: 1994, 26
RuTGERS LJ. 1064, 1064 n.2 (1995).
50
SeeJensen, supra note 46, at 4. Examples of state constitution education clauses
with quality-defining language include "'efficient system of high quality,' 'efficient,' 'general and efficient,' 'thorough and efficient,' 'general and uniform,' 'thorough and uniform,' 'general, uniform, and thorough,' 'complete and uniform,' 'liberal,' 'basic,'
'competent,' and 'suitable.'" Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted). "Fifteen states have no quality
statement at all, establishing a commitment only in terms of the existence of a system
without any given standard." Id. at 5.
51 See id. at 5. The Washington Constitution places the education duty above all other
duties. Id. The Illinois, Georgia, Louisiana, and Montana Constitutions define the education duty as a fundamental goal to provide citizens with education development to the
limits of their capacities. Id. at 5-6.
52 Id. at 6. Some states focus on intellectual, vocational, and scientific improvement,
while others focus on "cultural education," and still others on "moral or religious education." Id. at 6-7.
53 See id. at 7. For example, North Dakota's education clause counsels that, "'(a] high
degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity, and morality on the part of every voter in a
government by the people'" is necessary "'to insure the continuance of that government
and the prosperity and happiness of the people,'" and mandates that "'the legislative assembly shall make provision for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public
schools.'" Id (quoting N.D. CONsr. art. VIII, § 1).
54 See id. at 8 & n.42.
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Education Clauses as a Basisfor Inadequacy Claims

As an alternative to, or, more commonly, in addition to equal
protection-based claims, challengers to state education finance systems use education clauses to assert that the state education system is
inadequate. 55
Following Robinson, in cases based on state education clauses,
courts have expounded on the characteristics of adequacy necessary
to satisfy their state constitutional requirements. In the landmark
1989 case Rose v. Councilfor Better Education, Inc.,5 6 the Kentucky Supreme Court delineated seven factors governing educational
adequacy.
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide
each and every child ith at least the seven following capacities: (i)
sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students
to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable
the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand
the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv)
sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical weliness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each
student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi)
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and
pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic

or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete fa55 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Adequacy arguments have been successful as the sole basis for challenges in seven cases in which state supreme courts found the
state education funding system to be inadequate under education clause standards. &e
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (declaring that
"Kentucky's entire sstem of common schools is unconstitutional" because "the General Assembly of the Commonwealth has failed to establish an efficient system of common
schools"); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,527-28, 55556 (Mass. 1993) (holding that the state government had failed to fulfill its state constitutional duty to "cherish" the state public schools); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635
A-2d 1375, 1378-81 (N.H. 1993) ("Claremont 1") (interpreting the New Hampshire Constitution's education clause to impose a duty on the legislature to "cherish" public schools);
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) (invalidating the state system of education finance under the Ohio Constitution's education clause, which mandates a "thorough
and efficient system of common schools throughout the state"), clarified by DeRolph v.
State, 699 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1998); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535,540
(S.C. 1999) ("We hold today that the South Carolina Constitution's education clause requires the General Assembly to provide the opportunity for each child to receive a minimally adequate education."); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1.v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 92 (Wash. 1978)
(holding that "all children residing within the State's borders have a 'right' to be amply
provided with an education," that this right is "constitutionally paramount." and "must be
achieved through a 'general and uniform system of public schools" (quoting WAsu.
CoNsr. art. IX, § 2)).
56 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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vorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics
57
or in the job market.
Though state constitutions differ significantly in their education standard-setting language, courts' adequacy-based decisions have found
the Rose adequacy factors relevant to their determinations, regardless
58
of the exact language of the education clause in question.
2.

Education Clauses as a Basisfor Claims of Inequity

State constitution education clauses also provide the basis for
claims of inequity within education finance systems.5 9 In some cases,
the language in the state constitution's education clause also served as
the basis for claims identical to those brought under state equal protection clauses. For example, the Montana constitution's education
clause, which specifically states that "[e] quality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to every person of the state," 60 provided the basis
for the state supreme court to hold that "spending disparities among
the State's school districts translate into a denial of equality of educational opportunity."6 1 On the other hand, when language in the education clause fails to allude specifically to an equality mandate, courts
62
have been reluctant to imply this language.
The largest group of successful education finance reform plaintiffs are those who brought "hybrid" claims under both an equal protection clause (demanding horizontal equity) and an education clause
(demanding adequacy). 63 In contrast, the least successful plaintiffs
are those who attempted to substitute an education clause's demand
for "uniformity" for the mandate of an equal protection clause. My57

Id at 212.

58 See, e.g., McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 703 A.2d
1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) ("Claremont 11").
59 For example, the Texas Supreme Court initially interpreted its constitution's requirement that the state produce an "efficient" system of education as a demand for equity.
See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) ("Edgewood I").
Later, the court decided that efficiency mandated minimum adequacy. Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W.2d 450, 470 (Tex. 1995) ("Edgewood IV").
60
MONT. CONST. art X, § 1.
61
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989).
62 E.g., Scottv. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) (concluding that "nowhere does the [Virginia] Constitution require equal, or substantially equal, funding or
programs among and within the Commonwealth's school divisions," after noting the state
constitution admonishes government to avail itself of its peoples' talents "'by assuring opportunity for [the peoples'] fullest development by an effective system of education
throughout the Commonwealth.'" (quoting VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (alterations in the
original))).
63 Jensen, supra note 46, at 27; see also cases cited supra note 48 (invalidating education finance systems on equal protection grounds). But see Jenkins v. Leininger, 659
N.E.2d 1366 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) (rejecting plaintiffi' challenge to Illinois's education system based on the education and equal protection clauses of the state constitution and the
parental right to oversee a child's welfare).
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brid claims seek to establish equality as "justone measure of adequacy
to advance the quality of education.' 64 Hybrid claims are successful
due to the synergistic effect of equity and adequacy arguments in one
suit. Allegations of an education system's inadequacy bolster a plaintiff s demands for equity in taxing and spending.65 Furthermore, al-

leging inequality enables a plaintiff to present evidence of disparate
funding in support of inadequacy claims. 6 6
D. Education Finance Reform Litigation in New Hampshire and
Vermont
1.

New Hampshire's Claremont Litigation

New Hampshire school districts had been aware of the education
funding disparities since the 1970s, but attempts to initiate litigation
were unsuccessful until the 1990s. 67 Catalyzed by the loss of accreditation at Stevens High School in Claremont, New Hampshire,6 8 and the
state's apparent failure to distribute state aid in the manner to which
it had committed, 69 a coalition of plaintiffs-including five propertypoor school districts7 0-filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive
relief in Merrimack County Superior Court on June 12, 1991.71 The
plaintiffs alleged that (1) the inequitable and inadequate distribution
of state education funds violated the education clause of the New
64

Jensen, supra note 46, at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).

65
66

Id

Id.

Interview with Andru Volinsky, Partner, Stein, Volinsky, and Callahan, Concord,
NH, lead counsel for Claremont plaintiffs, in Concord, N.H. (August 12, 1999). In one early
case, Jesseman v. State, No. 83-371 (N.H. 1982), plaintiff school districts alleged that the
67

state education finance system violated the education clause of the New Hampshire Constitution by failing to equitably distribute education resources. ProceduralHistory of the Claremont Lawsui in Wss INst. For PuB. Poucy, THE CLAmtEMo\r EDUTIo. Lxvstur
BRMGING THE EDUCATION DIDE (1998), at http://iiiw.iissinst.org (last visited Aug. 31,
2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter, Procedural History]. The plaintiffs ultimately
dropped the suit when the 1985 Augenblick Bill in the New Hampshire legislature
amended the manner in which the state distributed education resources. See id.

68 Interview with Andru Volinsky, supra note 67; see also Royal Ford, 5 DistritsSue
N.H., Say Students Are Short-Changd BosroN GLOBE, June 14, 1991, at 1 (describing the
beginning of the Claremont litigation).
69 In 1983, education finance expert John Augenblick reported to the New Hamp-

shire House and Senate education committees on the funding disparities in New Hampshire and made recommendations for change. See ProceduralHistory, supra note 67. This
report resulted in the 1985 passage of the Augenblick Bill, see id., which is nor; codified as
N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. 198:29 (1989) (amended 1999). The codification of the "Augenblick
Formula" for distribution of "Foundation Aid" to school districts included an equalization
factor based on districts' property wealth, income wealth, and tax effort. See Procedural
History, supranote 67. However, the state never fully funded districts under the Augcnblick
Formula, which, among other things, prompted the Claremontlitigation. Id.
70
SeeFord, supranote 68, at 14 ("Named as petitioners in the New Hampshire suit are
school districts in Claremont, Franklin, Lisbon, Pittsfield and Allentown . ..
71
ProceduralHistorg, supra note 67.
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Hampshire Constitution; 72 and (2) the current system's reliance on
property taxes to finance public schools exceeded the state's constitutional tax powers. 73 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that taxpayers in
property-poor districts paid a significantly higher property tax rate, yet
their tax efforts raised less money per pupil than those in propertyrich districts.74 The plaintiffs argued that "[t]he amount of state funding-less than eight percent of the total spent on public education-

[was] insufficient to allow property poor districts to provide an adequate education to their children or to allow the districts to make up
for the deficiencies in their property values." 75 Finding that the language of the education clause of the New Hampshire Constitution,
which requires the legislature to "cherish public schools," imposed no
duty on the state to support public schools, Judge Manias of the Superior Court granted the state's motion to dismiss on August 13, 1992.76
The school districts subsequently appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.

77

Relying on dictionaries in existence at the time of the New
Hampshire Constitution's inception, 78 the supreme court determined
that the duty to cherish education is not "merely a statement of aspiration" and that "[t]he language commands, in no uncertain terms, that
72
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1377 (N.H. 1993) ("Claremont
I"). The education clause reads:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being
essential to the preservation of a free government; and spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through the various parts of the
country, being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of
the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this government, to
cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and
public schools, to encourage private and public institutions, rewards, and
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce,
trades, manufactures, and natural history of the country, to countenance
and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public
and private charity, industry and economy, honesty and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous sentiments, among the
people.
N.H. CONST. pt. If, art. 83.
73 Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1377. The state constitution lists among the duties of the
legislature the power to "impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates,
and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and residents within, the said state." N.H. CONs-r.
pt II, art. 5. Plaintiffs argued that when provision of education is the duty of the state,
taxes used to fund education must be proportional and reasonable. When taxpayers in
property-poor districts pay a significantly higher property tax rate than taxpayers in property-rich districts, yet by these tax efforts raise less money per pupil, the system depends on
disproportional and unreasonable assessment. See ProceduralHistoy, supra note 67.
74 See ProceduralHistoiy, supranote 67.
75 Id.

76
77

Id

Id.
Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378 (relying on a 1780 dictionary defining "duty" as
"[t]hat to which a man is by any natural or legal obligation bound" and "cherish" as "[tlo
support, to shelter, to nurse up" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
78
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the State provide an education to all its citizens and that it support all
public schools." 79 The court also looked to the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive
Office of Education,0 which construed the similarly worded education
clause of the Massachusetts Constitution as providing such an affirmative duty.8 1 Concluding that the right to a free public education is "at
the very least an important, substantive right,"8 2 the supreme court
remanded the case to the superior court for a determination of
whether New Hampshire's education finance system adequately dis3
charged this duty.
On remand, Judge Manias again ruled in favor of the state.8" In a
three-part analysis, the lower court adopted the state's restrictive defi-

nition of educational adequacy,8 5 determined that the current education finance system met that definition of adequacy,86 and concluded
that the state constitution did not mandate equitability and adequacy
of education.8 7 As for the claim that the school property tax system
79

Id.
615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). The New Hampshire Supreme Court vs also comfortable looking to Massachusetts for precedent because of the states' shared colonial history and the similarities in language in their education clauses. See Claremont1,635 A.2d at
1378.
81
See ClarmontI, 635 A.2d at 1378, 1381.
82
Id. at 1381.
83
Id. at 1382.
84 ProceduralHistoy, supranote 67.
85 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1357 (N.H. 1997) ('Claremont
I"). The State Board of Education developed this definition, which provided that "[a]n
adequate public elementary and secondary education in New Hampshire is one which provides each educable child with an opportunity to acquire the knowledge and learning necessary to participate intelligently in the American political, economic, and social s)stem of
free government." Id. By contrast, the plaintiff's proposed definition of educational adequacy, prepared by an education expert, required the state to take responsibility for providing sufficient resources to recognize the special needs of gifted and at-risk students, to
manage schools efficiently, and to enable students to achieve reasonable educational goals.
ProceduralHistoy, supra note 67.
86 ProceduralHistory, supra note 67. Evidence presented to the court matched the five
plaintiff districts to "comparison districts" of equal population. Id. In the district of Franklin, the equalized property valuation per student in 1993 was $183,626, compared to the
district of Gilford, with a property valuation per student of $536,761. Id. Even though
Franklin's 1993-94 tax rate was higher than Gilford's by $3.93 per $1000 of property value,
Gilford was able to raise $2901 more per student than Franklin. Id. Even more dramatic is
the discrepancy between plaintiff district of Pittsfield and its comparison district of
Moultonborough. See id. In 1993, Moultonborough, on Lake Wnnepesaukee, had an
equalized property value per student of $1,319,221, compared to Pittsfield's $120,792. Id.
Despite Pittsfield's property tax rate of $25.32 per $1000 of property, it was able to raise
only $4493 per student, while Moultonborough could tax at a rate of $5A8 per $1000 of
property value and raise $6426 per student. The trial court acknowledged the discrepancy,
but discredited it by stating that "tax rate, standing alone, is not an accurate measure of tax
burden; other factors such as income level partially determine the 'burden' the tax actually
imposes." Id.
87 Id. Judge Manias pointed out that the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Claremont
Imade no specific reference to adequacy or equality required under the state constitution.
80
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violated the "proportional and reasonable" requirement of the taxa-

tion clause, the court determined that local property taxes are municipal taxes, not state taxes, and thus immune from the requirement. 88
On second appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court again
overturned the lower court.8 9 First, the court invalidated the tax system, reasoning that because education is a nondelegable state duty,

taxes raised in support of education are state taxes, not municipal
taxes, and therefore must be "'equal in valuation and uniform in
rate"' to comply with the taxation clause. 90 Second, the court declared that students have a fundamental right to a constitutionally adequate education9 1 and consequently employed strict judicial
scrutiny. 92 In concluding that the current education finance system

did not meet adequacy standards, the supreme court rejected the trial
court's definition of adequacy, adopting instead the seven Rose factors
for determining adequacy. 93 While acknowledging some value in local control over education, the court asserted that "the State cannot

use local control as a justification for allowing the existence of educational services below the level of constitutional adequacy. '94 The
court gave the state legislature a deadline of April 1, 1999, to develop
a tax scheme for funding education that would equalize property valu-

ation and tax rates statewide. 95

ME The district court rejected equal protection claims, citing lack of a fundamental right
and suspect classification. Id. It thus applied "middle tier" scrutiny to the education finance system, and found it to be "a reasonable, not arbitrary classification" with a "fair and
substantial relationship to the object of the legislation." Id. The district court maintained
that the petitioners did not demonstrate that the current funding system of local property
tax plus foundation aid resulted in inadequate educational opportunity. See id.
88 Id.
89 Claremont Sch. Dist v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) ("Claremont II").
90 Id. at 1355 (quoting Opinion of theJustices, 379 A.2d 782, 786 (N.H. 1977)). New
Hampshire became the first state to hold an education system unconstitutional based on
unequal taxation. DAVID LONG, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUc.,
INTRODUCrION TO SCHOOL FINANCE ITIGATiON (1999), at http://wwiv.nces.ed.gov/edfin/
litigation/Introduction.asp [hereinafter LONG, INTRODUCION].
91 Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1358-59. The court pointed out that the education clause
is one of only two places in the entire New Hampshire Constitution where the framers
placed an affirmative duty on the legislature. Id. at 1358.

92
93

Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1359 (defining an adequate education as one that extends beyond "[miere

competence" in "reading, writing, and arithmetic" to the "broad exposure to the social,
economic, scientific, technological, and political realities of today's society (which] is essential for our students to compete, contribute, and flourish in the twenty-first century");
see also text accompanying supra notes 56-57 (discussing the Rose factors).
94 Claremont I,703 A.2d at 1360.
95 Geeta O'Donnell Anand, Who Wins and Who Loses Under N.H.Tax Proposals,WALL
ST. J.-NEw ENG., Mar. 17, 1999, available at WAVSJ 5444725.
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In May of 1998, the court denied the state's motion to vacate its
ruling in Claremont 1.96 Later that year, the court expressed its opin97
ion that the legislature's proposed remedy, known as the ABC plan,
98
was unconstitutional. Meanwhile, conservative legislators unsuccessfully attempted to introduce a referendum for a constitutional amendment that would have nullified the court's decision in ClaremontH.99
In November of 1998, the court denied the state's request for a twoyear period in which to comply with Claremont i.' 00 In May of 1999,
the court ruled that the state's proposed use of a referendum vote to
enact a tax plan was an unconstitutional delegation of power.10 1
2.

Vermont's Brigham Litigation

In Vermont, disparities in tax effort and education opportunities
among communities, similar to those in its neighboring communities
across the Connecticut River,' 0 2 as well as failed legislative efforts to
reform the education funding system, inspired the American Civil Liberties Union of Vermont (ACLU) to seek judicial action. 103 Vermont's education finance system was similar to New Hampshire's
prior to Claremont it consisted of a codified foundation formula, in
96
See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 712 A.2d 612 (N.H. 1998) ("Claremont 111")
(denying the state's argument that a state statute disqualified the retired judge in the case
because he was over age seventy).
97 The ABC (Advancing Better Classrooms) plan HB 1280-Local, %as a proposal to tax

property at a uniform rate, but allowed property-wealthy districts to set their rates lower
than the uniform rate. Opinion of the Justices (School Financing), 712 A.2d 1080, 1085
(N.H. 1998).
98 Id. at 1087.
99 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 725 A.2d 648, 650 (N.H. 1998) ("Claremont
IV"). In October 1999, the New Hampshire Senate passed a proposal to amend the New
Hampshire Constitution that would validate the taxation system found unconstitutional in
Claremont!. Constitutional Amendment Con. Res. 26, 156th Leg. (N.H. 1999). However,
as predicted, the proposal died in the state House of Representatives. See e.g., Lawmahers
May Team Up to Get Courts Out of Loop, FoSr 'S DAILY DE.mOCRAT, Dec. 11, 1999, at 1, 8;
Norma Love, Republican Leaders'BestShot at ConstiiutionalAmendmentFallsShort, AssomaD
PREss, Jan. 14, 2000, available at WL APWIRES 02:16:00.
100 See Claremont IV, 725 A.2d at 649 ("Absent extraordinary circumstances, delay in
achieving a constitutional system is inexcusable.").
101 See Opinion of the Justices (Tax Plan Referendum), 725 A.2d 1082 (N.H. 1999).
102 See Robert Gensburg, The Road to Equal Educalional Opportunioy for Vermont School
Children, 22 VT. L REv. 1, 1 (1997). For example, in 1995, the property taxes on an
$85,000 home in the ski resort town of Stratton were $17, while the taxes on a house of the
same value in the town of Stannard were $2640. Id. at 7. Property values were even disparate as between towns within the same union school district. See id. Gensburg proides an
additional anecdotal example of how tax base disparities lead to disparities in fundamental
education resources: In 1994 the property-poor, high-tax school district of Hardwick had
to eliminate a first grade remedial reading program because it could not afford to pay its
share of the cost of the largely federally-funded program, while the nearby, property-rich,
ski-resort town of Stowe contemplated an appropriation of $84,000 to repair the tennis
courts at Stowe High School Id. at 2.
103 See id.at 2.
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which state aid supplemented local effort in order to meet a legislatively determined, minimum per-pupil expenditure in each district.104
In March of 1995, a group of students, taxpayers, and two school
districts filed suit against the state,' 05 alleging violations of the education'0 6 and equal protection 0 7 clauses of Vermont's constitution.
Judge Meaker of the Lamoille County Superior Court granted the
State's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that education is not
a fundamental right under the Vermont Constitution and that the
provision the plaintiffs relied upon does not confer a private right of
action.' 0 8 On joint appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court recognized
that its duty was "solely to define the impact of the State Constitution
on educational funding."10 9 At the outset, the court determined that
the education funding system in place did not eliminate wealth disparities, but only equalized funding "to a level of a minimally adequate
education program.""10 Assessing the education clause of the Vermont Constitution in its historical context,1 1 ' the court concluded
that education is a fundamental obligation of the state, a responsibility
the state may not delegate to municipalities. 1 2 In the equal protection analysis that followed, the court held that the state's argument
that "local control" justified such a shift of responsibility did not constitute a legitimate government purpose underlying the education finance system. 113
104 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 3492-3499 (1989) (repealed 1997, effective 1998).
105 Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). The principal plaintiff was Amanda
Brigham, an elementary school student in the district of Whiting, Vermont. In Whiting,
the property tax base was less than 70% of the state average. See Gensburg, supra note 102,
at 8.

106

VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68 ("[A] competent number of schools ought to be maintained

in each town unless the general assembly permits other provisions for the convenient instruction of youth.").
107 VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7 ("[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community .... "); VT.
CoNsT. ch. I, art. 9 ("[E]very member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoy.
ment of life, liberty, and property, and therefore is bound to contribute the member's
proportion towards the expence of that protection .... ").
108 Brigham v. State, No. 53-3-95, slip op. at 9-10 (Lamoille County Super. Ct. Oct. 2,
1996).
109 Brigham 692 A.2d at 386.
110 Id. at 388.
111 Id. at 392-93. The court considered the importance of fostering republican values,
or "public virtue," that the framers of the Vermont Constitution considered "a matter literally affecting the survival of the new Republic" and "'necessary to preserve the blessings of
liberty.'" Id. at 392 (quoting VT. CONsT. of 1777, ch. I, art. 16). That the framers subsequently combined the virtue and education clauses into a single section suggests their
equally strong conception of the importance of education. See id. at 393.
112 I. at 395.
113 The court rejected the state's local control argument, reasoning that "poorer districts cannot realistically choose to spend more for educational excellence than their property wealth will allow, no matter how much sacrifice their voters are willing to make. The
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II
LEGIsLATIVE RESPONSES TO EDUCATION REFomi DECISIONS

-

Professor Molly S. McUsic reminds us that "winning in the courtroom is not the same as winning in the classroom,"" 4 suggesting that
litigation victories are only half the battle for proponents of education
reform. After a court invalidates a state's methods for funding education, the legislature then must enact a remedy responsive to both judi1 15
cial and public concerns.
Litigation prompts most modem legislative reform, 11 but
whether plaintiffs base their claims on an education clause or an
equal protection clause does not necessarily dictate the components
of the resulting legislative reform. As mentioned in Part I, claims
based on either or both of these sources can place equity in the re7
form spotlight."
This Part first considers equity-based elements of reform, including minimum expenditures, spending caps and recapture, consolidation of districts and tax bases, and giving districts a choice among
various remedies. The reforms adopted in Connecticut, Arkansas,
California, Wyoming, and Texas exemplify how these elements come
into play. Next, this Part describes adequacy-based elements of reform, such as those adopted by Kentucky and Massachusetts. Lastly,
this Part presents arguments favoring and opposing equity- and adequacy-based elements of reform.
A.

Equity Elements of Reform

Legislatures responding to courts' equity concerns generally focus on the equalization of funding.1 8 Reformers define equity in
three ways. The first, most common type is "horizontal equity," the
current system plainly does not enhance fiscal choice for poorer school districts." Id. at
396.
"14 Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distributionof Education: The Promises and Pit.
falls of SchoolFtnanceLitigation, in LAw AND SCHOOL Rr~oLM.: SIX STATEGiES FOR PO.MONxaG
EDUCATIONAL EQUITy 88, 107 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999).
115 Kg., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) ("Claremont I") ("We are confident that the legislature and the Governor will fulfill their responsibility with respect to defining the specifics of, and the appropriate means to provide
through public education, the knowledge and learning essential to the preservation of a
free government"); Brgha, 692 A.2d at 398 ("Although the [Vermont] Legislature
should act under the Vermont Constitution to make educational opportunity available on

substantially equal terms, the specific means of discharging this broadly defined duty is
properly left to its discretion.").
116 For an example of litigation-free education reform, see generally Charles Berger,
Equity Mithout Adjudication: Kansas School FinanceReform and the 1992 School Distfict Finance
and Quality PerformanceAct, 27J.L & EDUC. 1 (1998) (emaluating education finance reform
initiated by the Kansas state legislature which had not been catal)yed by a court mandate).
117 See supra Part I.C.1-2.
118

See McUsic, supra note 114, at 104.
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theory that per-pupil expenditures should not materially differ between rich districts and poor districts.1 19 The second type is "vertical
equity," which evaluates a system's ability to account for differing
needs of school districts with varying populations of special education
1 20
students, bilingual students, and gifted and talented students.
Closely related to the other types of equity is "fiscal neutrality," which
"requires similar tax efforts and burdens among districts." 12 1 Thus,
invalidation of an education funding system for lack of equity, under
either an equal protection or education clause, may inspire any of a
number of legislative remedies, including: (1) modification or implementation of a foundation program to ensure minimum per-student
spending; (2) spending caps and "recapture" provisions that limit the
education spending of property-rich districts; (3) consolidation of tax
bases or school districts; and (4) others means of equalizing tax
22
bases.'
1.

"Leveling Up"."Minimum Expenditure Requirements

A state that adopts a "leveling up" approach will increase the revenue in districts where education spending is below the state mean. For
example, in Connecticut, the General Assembly responded to Horton
v. Meskill123 by enacting a leveling up approach that contained two
components: a guaranteed tax base grant and a minimum expenditure requirement.' 2 4 Under this approach, districts that demonstrate
an inability to meet minimum expenditure requirements per pupil
qualify for the guaranteed tax base (GTB) grant. 125 The state distributes the grant under the GTB formula, which takes into account the
district's wealth (measuring real and personal property), the district's
need (measuring the relationship between the district's educational
expenditures and per capita income), and the district's population
(measuring the number of students in the district). 12 Because the
formula generates a figure for state aid designed to put the district in
the financial position it would be in if it had the tax base of a desig119 See Erin E. Kelly, Note, All Students Are Not CreatedEqual: The Inequitable Combination
of Property-Tax-BasedSchool Finance Systems and Local Contro 45 DuKE LJ. 397, 402 (1995),
120
121

1d.
Id.

122

See discussion infra Part I.-1-4.

376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) ("Horton I") (invalidating education finance system
under the strict scrutiny afforded to fundamental rights under the state equal protection
123

clause).
124

Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099, 1101 (Conn. 1985) ("Horton II").

125
126

See id.
Id. at 1101 n.2.
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nated target district, the formula ensures horizontal equity among tax27
payers of different districts.'
Education finance reform litigation in Arkansas elicited a similar
legislative response. The School Finance Act of 1984128 contained a
guarantee that state aid per student will supplement a school district's
local expenditures to meet a minimum amount per student. 2 9 The
Act also required reassessment and equalization of property values
within the state. 3 0

2. "LevelingDown": Spending Caps and Recapture
In a "leveling down" approach, the state ensures horizontal equity
among taxpayers of different districts by "recapturing" local money
raised in wealthier school districts and distributing it to poorer districts.' 3 ' For example, the California state legislature attempted to adhere to the state supreme court's equal protection mandate in Serrano
Hby enacting a plan to redistribute property tax revenues collected in
property-rich districts to property-poor ones. 3 2- This leveling down
equality-based remedy so incensed the majority of California voters
that they preempted the measure by passing a ballot initiative called
Proposition 13.133 This constitutional amendment capped property
taxes at 1% of the assessed property value and prohibited implementation of a statewide property tax.' M The amendment forced any district wishing to raise funds though additional nonproperty taxes to
obtain voters' consent by a two-thirds majority 3 5
The result of this measure was to transfer the bulk of education
financing from the local district level to the state level.13 6 Critics
charged that although the state's plan distributed funds on a relatively
127
See id.at 1101-02 & 1101 n.2. The Horton II court found the distribution of categorical grants for transportation, construction, and special education under the system enacted in response to Horton I to be constitutional under a modified equal protection
analysis. Id. at 1105, 1108. The court required the plaintiff to make a prima fade showing
of a greater-than-de-minimis disparity in expenditure and then shifted the burden onto the
state to show that the disparities are the result of a legitimate government purpose and that

the disparities are not so great as to render the scheme unconstitutional. Id. at 1106.
128 Aim CODE ANN. § 6-20-301 to § 6-20-319 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991).
129
SeFayetteville Sch. Dist. No. I v. Ark. State Bd. of Educ., 852 S.WL2d 122, 123 (Ark.
1993) (upholding changes to the state finance system using equal protection analysis).
130 Id.
131
Verstegen, supra note 32, at 249.
132
See Hanif S. P. Hirji, Note, Inequalities in Calfornia'sPublic School System: The Undermining ofSerrano v. Priest and the Needfor a Mininum StandardsSystem ofEducation, 32 Loy.
LA. L REv. 583, 599-600 (1999).
133
Id. at 600.
134

Id

'35
136

Id.
See id. at 600-01.
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equal basis, 13 7 it reduced local control over education and increased
the likelihood that other state finance obligations would take priority
over the security of funds needed to sustain education quality. 3 8
At the time of Serrano 11, California ranked eighteenth in the nation for expenditures per average daily attendance (ADA).'39 It subsequently dropped to forty-sixth, 140 and to forty-ninth in reading
14 1
proficiency.
Wyoming's initial legislative response to its state supreme court's
holding in Washakie County SchoolDistrictNumber One v. Herschler42 also
exemplifies a leveling down approach:
In response to Washakie's holding that school funding must depend
upon state wealth and not local wealth, the select committee proposed solutions to redistribute some local wealth to other districts.
Those solutions culminated in an amendment to the state constitution authorizing the legislature to "recapture" revenues generated
by the [mandatory local tax of one dollar of tax per $1000 of property value] which exceeded an amount determined by formula. Local wealth remained a factor in the system, however, when the
optional mill levy was made available to the school districts according them the option of levying another six mills for their own
3
use. 14
The legislature then allocated recaptured funds to school districts on
the basis of district "classroom units." 144 These classroom units derived from each district's average daily membership, adjusted to include transportation and special education expenditures. 145 The
legislature then multiplied the total number of classroom units in a
district by a legislatively-determined classroom value for the state guar146
antee amount.
The Wyoming Supreme Court struck down this system in Campbell
County School District v. State,147 citing both equal protection and adequacy grounds. 148 Wyoming voters amended the state constitution to
allow the recapture of funds from wealthy districts for distribution to
137

A California appellate court upheld the education finance sytem developed by the

legislature after Proposition 13 took effect. Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Ct. App.
1986) ("Serrano III").
138
See Hirji, supra note 132, at 601.
139 Id. at 596.

140

See McUsic, supra note 114, at 112 (using 1994 statistics).

141
142
143

See id.
606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1247 (Wyo. 1995).

144

Id. at 1248.
Id.
Id. at 1249.
907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).
See id.at 1266, 1279-80.

145

146
147
148
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property-poor districts, 14 9 and the legislature enacted recapture provisions in 1997.150
3.

Consolidating Tax Bases and School Districts

The Texas state legislature responded to the state supreme
court's invalidation of the state education finance system' 5 1 with a
plan to consolidate school districts. 52 Senate Bill 351, passed on
April 12, 1991, consolidated Texas's 254 counties into 188 County Education Districts (CEDs) .153 Each multicounty CED was the taxing authority for the school districts it contained.15 4 The legislature spread
tax revenues from wealthy districts among their property-poor neighbors by requiring that no CED exceed $280,000 in taxable property
value per ADA.' 55 In addition, the legislature turned the existing twotiered formula for determining state aid into a three-tiered
formula.' 56 First, CEDs that taxed at a rate of $0.72 per $100 in property value received the basic allotment of $2200 per student. 5 7 Second, CEDs could tax up to an additional $0.45 per $100 to raise funds
for instruction and facilities. 158 Third, local districts could raise funds
beyond the authority of the CED.' 5 9
Wealthy districts challenged this reform, and onJanuary 30, 1992,
the Texas Supreme Court invalidated it under Texas's constitutional

prohibition against a statewide property tax.' 60 The legislature's new
plan, ultimately upheld, 161 retained both the two-tiered formula for
determining a district's state aid and the consolidation of tax bases,
SeelWo. CONST. art. 15, § 17.
150 See Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 985 P.2d 964, 966 (Wyo. 1999)
(describing the recapture provisions found in 1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 3, §§ 101-701).
151 See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) ('Edgemood
Il"); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) ("Edgcwood I"). In
both cases, the overturned system consisted of some -ariation on a minimum ex'penditure
("Foundation") system that used a two-tiered formula to calculate need. &e Edgeu'od 11.
149

804 S.W.2d at 495. In a notable display ofjudicial activism, the Edgmwo~d ff court specifically recommended tax-base consolidation as a remedy. Id. at 497; srej. Steven Farr &
Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama:An Epic Questfor Education Equit; 17 YALu L &
POL'Y REv. 607, 653 (1999).
152 See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 151, at 660.
153 An Act Relating to Public Schools, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 20 (Vernon).
154 See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 151, at 661.
155 Id
156

See id

157
158
159

Id.
Id-

Id

Carroilton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. DiSt., 826
S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tex. 1992) ("Edgewood III). The court also held the plan levied an ad
valorem tax without a referendum in violation of TE-X. CNsr. art. VII § 3. Edgeod M, 826
S.V.2d at 493.
161 See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995) (Edgewvood
160

1V").
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school districts, or both, as an option for districts with a tax base
62
greater than $280,000 per ADA. 1
4.

Giving Districts a Choice Among Various Equity Remedies

The current Texas plan contains other equity remedies that this
Note has not heretofore addressed. As mentioned above, the current
1 63
system in Texas determines state aid using a two-tiered formula.
Tier one, the Foundation program, consists of block grants of $2300
per pupil in districts that tax $0.86 per $100 property value. 6 4 Tier
two is a guaranteed yield program, whereby districts with property
value of less than $205,000 per pupil in ADA can tax at a rate between
$0.86 and $1.50 per $100 property value. 165 For each penny above
$0.86 that the district taxes, the state contributes an additional $20.55
per weighted ADA. 16 6 Furthermore, any district with property wealth
greater than the threshold amount of $280,000 per ADA must take
steps to reduce its tax base in one of five ways: (1) consolidating with a
property-poor district; (2) detaching commercial property and allowing it to be annexed to a property-poor district, thereby increasing
the poor district's tax base; (3) purchasing "attendance credits" from
the state (essentially a form of recapture resulting in funds sent to the

state); (4) contracting for the education of nonresident students; or
(5) consolidating tax districts by setting up a mini-CED. 167
Although the Texas Supreme Court conceded that this system
fails to provide absolute equity, 68 the court also found that this system
meets the requirements of the state constitution. 169 Giving wealthy
See id at 727.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 151, at 630-81.
165
See id. at 681.
166
Id. Texas also has an Available School Fund (ASF) (consisting of fund interest and
gas tax revenue) that is dispersed among districts on the basis of ADA. Id. at 682, ASF
funds are distributed in lieu of, not in addition to, foundation aid and guaranteed yield.
Id. Therefore, the state aid that a district is entitled to consists of: tier one allotment plus
guaranteed yield from tier two minus per capita allotment from ASF, minus the district's
local share of tier one and two property tax revenue raised. See id.
167
Id. at 683.
168
See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 729-30 (Tex. 1995)
("Edgewood IV"). Plaintiffs challenged the system based on the $600 per-pupil gap in
revenue between property-rich and -poor districts taxing at the maximum of $1.50 per
$100 in property value. See id. at 731. Property-poor districts taxing at the maximum received state funding of $2300 per pupil plus the additional $20.55 for every cent between
$0.86 and $1.50, or $1315, for a total of $3615 per pupil. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note
151, at 687. At the same time, districts with the maximum property value of $280,000
taxing at $1.50 per $100 in property value could raise $4200 per pupil. Id.
169
Edgewood I, 917 S.W.2d at 737. The trial court had previously held that an "efficient" system required by the Texas Constitution demanded absolute equity. Id. at 730,
The supreme court adopted a different approach, interpreting "efficient" as demanding a
level of adequacy achieved by the current system's substantial equity. Id. at 730.
162
163
164
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districts options regarding reduction of their tax yield made Texas's
unique approach of coupling a guaranteed yield formula with the
equivalent of a spending cap (in the form of a maximum property tax
base) more palatable. 170 Indeed, the system has already achieved
some measures of success, including increases in the percentage of
equalized revenue, in revenue available per pupil in poor districts, in
the overall amount of education funding, and in student performance
71
on statewide testing.'
B. Adequacy Elements of Reform
In general, adequacy-based remedies differ from equity-based
remedies in many ways. First, if a state supreme court deems all
schools in a state inadequate, then an adequacy-based reform will
have the effect of elevating all schools to a state-prescribed minimum
adequacy level. 172 Second, if certain groups of students have special
needs, an adequacy-based reform will ensure that those groups receive
the additional funding they require to meet state-determined standards for academic achievement' 73 Third, by taking into account
both a district's outputs and inputs, adequacy remedies seek to maximize the outcome-to-input ratio (i.e., "efficiency") and thus contain
assessment and accountability components. 74
From a education policy standpoint, adequacy-based remedies
are more complex than equity-based remedies, which seek to equalize
170 In 1993-94, ninety-eight of Texas's 281 districts exceeded the $280,000 property
alue threshold. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 151, at 684. Sixty-four optioned to
purchase attendance credit, thirty opted to contract to educate students from other districts, while four opted for a combination of attendance credits and contracting for students. Id. No district opted for consolidation or detachment. Id.
171
See id. at 706; see also Craig D. Jerald, The State of the States, Et.Dca N.K (QuALm
Couirrs 2000),Jan. 13, 2000, at 62, 62 (noting that "Texas'[s] African-American and His-

panic students performed as well as or better than the average 8th grader in the other
populous, ethnically diverse states of California, Florida, and New York"). In 1997-98,

Texas school districts with the lowest effective tax rates (including Edgewood) and districts
with the highest total effective tax rates (including Alamo Heights) had total per-pupil
expenditures of $5245 and $4984 respectively- a difference of 4.9%. &'eTax. DE,'T Ect.c
SNAPsHoT '98: TAx EFfORT. Su.Nutv TABLs (1999), at http://ww-.teastate.tx.us/perfreport/snapshot/98/taxeffort.htmL
172 See gnerally Martha I. Morgan et al., EstablishingEducation Pro rm Inadequacy: The
Alabama Example, 28 U. MicH. J.L Rx-roas 559 (1995) (lauding legislative reform that implemented adequacy standards in Alabama using a combination of state and national standards for inputs and outcomes).
173 See, ag., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408-10 (NJ. 1990) (ordering high perstudent spending for pupils' "special educational needs"); see also, e.g., Sheffv. O'Neill, 609
A.2d 1072, 1074-76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (considering racial and economic segregation
as factors in the deprivation of a "minimally adequate education"); William H. Cune, EducationalAdequacy: A 77zeoy and Its Rmedies, 28 U. MicH.J.L RErot, 481, 487 n.22 (1995)
(discussing Shef and Abbott).
174 See Clune supranote 173, at 481.
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economic inputs. 175 Courts mandating adequacy-based remedies may
require legislatures to define adequacy standards (if the court has not
already done so), implement or modify mechanisms by which to evaluate school districts' achievement of those standards, or implement or
modify the state's financial structure to afford districts the means to
176
perform self-evaluation.

Courts differ in their approaches to defining adequacy standards,
Some are reluctant to perform a policymaking role and leave it up to
the state legislatures to define adequacy. 17 7 Lack of guidance from
the court, however, can be problematic during the remedy phase 78
Conversely, courts that define adequacy too extensively run the risk of
constraining the legislature. 179 Either way, guidance from the courts
largely influences states' education reform efforts.
1. Kentucky's Model Adequacy Reform
In response to the Kentucky Supreme Court's invalidation of the
state's system for funding education after finding the "entire system of
common schools" to be unconstitutional, 8 0 the Kentucky General Assembly enacted one of the most comprehensive legislative reform
plans to date.'"' The Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990
(KERA) 182 was a direct response to the seven factors of adequacy the
supreme court defined earlier in Rose.'83 In order to assure that eduSee id. at 485. But see Robinson, supra note 5, at 494-95 (arguing from a taxation
standpoint that adequacy remedies are less complex because they are concerned with quality of service rather than differences in resources).
176
See Clune, supra note 173, at 487-90.
177 See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 56 (RI. 1995) (deferring to the
legislature to define adequacy); cf.Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139,
152 (Tenn. 1993) (declining to address the issue of adequacy in light of pladntiffs' strong
equal protection claim); William F. Dietz, Note, ManageableAdequacy Standards in Education
Reform Litigation, 74 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1193, 1205-06 (1996) (suggesting that the Tennessee
Supreme Court's use of equal protection analysis was an attempt to avoid defining
adequacy).
178
See Dietz, supra note 177, at 1206-07. For example, after the Texas Supreme Court
struck down the state education finance system on adequacy grounds without defining
adequacy standards in Edgewood I, it found the legislative responses inappropriate remedies
in two subsequent cases, Edgewood Hand Edgewood 111, before it finally found the legislative
response to be constitutional. See supra Part l.A.3.
179
In NewJersey, for example, the supreme court imposed specific mandates and enjoined particular expenditures. See Dietz supra note 177, at 1207-08 (describing the "political struggle among all three branches of government in NewJersey" that erupted when the
court sought to specifically mandate education reform measures).
180 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989).
181 See Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in
Kentucky, 28J.L. & EDUC. 485,499 (1999); C. Scott Trimble &Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving
Equity and Excellence in Kentucky Education, 28 U. MicH. J.L. R~xoPmi 599, 609 (1995).
182
See Kentucky Education Reform Act, ch. 456, 1990 Ky. Acts 1208 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Ky. Rxv. STAT. ANN., chs. 156-165 and other scattered
chapters).
183
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
175
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cation outcomes met minimum standards of student achievement,
such as standardized test scores and dropout rates, 18 KERA's drafters
aimed their reform efforts at the areas of curriculum, governance, and
18 5
finance.
KERA's financial reform consists of a leveling up equity approach: a foundation program that guarantees a minimum per-pupil
expenditure statewide.' 8 6 Districts must tax property at the equalized
rate of $0.30 per $100 of assessed value (called the Equivalent Tax
Rate, or ETR) to qualify for a base level of adjusted per-pupil funding
from the state.'8 7 Districts are allowed to supplement state aid according to a two-tiered formula.188 A tier I district may levy additional
property taxes to yield revenue of no more than 15% of the minimum
guaranteed base. 189 Districts electing to participate in tier I that have
property wealth 150% below the statewide average per-pupil assessment also receive equalization funds.' 9 0 A tier II district may generate
additional funds up to 30% of the minimum, guaranteed base, but is
not entitled to equalization funds.' 9 ' Tier I, essentially a revenue cap,

is credited with lowering expenditure disparities between propertyrich and property-poor districts.' 9

2

But because the tier II cap ex-

empts the wealthiest districts, critics argue that the plan fails to narrow
the expenditure gap between the extreme ends of the property wealth
spectrum. 193 However, KERA's finance reform increased local and
state spending on education in the year following its enactment by
$700 million over the previous year.' 9 4 This additional funding allowed for an overall increase in per-pupil funding and teacher salaries
and for reduction of class sizes.19 KERA also implemented the Facilities Support Program, which equalizes local funds for construction
and renovation. 196
KERA's curriculum-based provisions first establish goals and standards designed to be more challenging than previous minimum academic standards. 197 KERA requires schools to assess student
184

See Clune, supra note 173, at 485.

185

Trimble &Forsaith, supra note 181, at 610.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 157.360 (Banks-Balduin 1999).
IM § 160.470(12) (a).

186

187

Id. § 157.440.
I& § 157.440(1) (a).
190 Id. § 157.440(1)(b).
191 Id § 157.440(2) (a).
192 Prior to KERA's implementation, the Kentucky school districts saw a 35.87% disparity in wealth. Following KERA's implementation, the disparity fell to 16.72%. ,&eKelly.
supranote 119, at 406.
193 EFgid.
194 Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 181, at 599-600.
195 Hunter, supra note 181, at 502.
196 I& at 503.
197 See id. at 501.
188
189
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performance in grades four, eight, and twelve with comprehensive
testing.' 98 It also fosters school accountability by rewarding or sanctioning schools based on assessment results. 199 KERA's governance
reform consists of restructuring provisions designed to reduce political impact on education policy. 20 0 Specifically, it transferred governing authority to local schools while reducing the size of the state
20 1
Department of Education.
Although it has only been five years since KERA's implementation, Kentucky schools are showing signs of improvement.2 0 2 The National Assessment of Educational Programs has documented
consistent improvement of Kentucky students in writing since the
state's reform efforts began. 20 3 Statewide assessment in 1998 revealed
top-twenty performances by several high-poverty elementary
schools. 20 4 The General Assembly continues to modify its assessment
20 5
and accountability efforts.
2.

Following Kentucky's Lead: Education Reform in Massachusetts

Following the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ruling that the state's education system violated the mandate of
the state constitution's education clause to "cherish" the state's public
schools, 2 0 6 the Massachusetts legislature responded with comprehensive reform. Like KERA, the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of
1993 (MERA) 20 7 consists of measures to equalize inputs, perform assessment, and foster district accountability. 20 8 MERA's finance reform
198

Ky.REv.

STAT. ANN. §

158.6453. Kentucky's performance-based assessment is de-

signed to evaluate how a student organizes, communicates, and applies knowledge. See
Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 181, at 614-15. In addition to traditional multiple choice
questions, the assessment program includes performing arts assessment and writing portfolios. See id. at 617. In 1998, the General Assembly modified the assessment component of
the original KERA by creating the Commonwealth Accountability Testing System, which
retains the comprehensive means of testing, but reduces the potential sanctions for districts that do not meet testing standards. Hunter, supra note 181, at 515.
199 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.6455.
200 See Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 181, at 611-12.
201 Id. at 611. Every school has a management council on which the principal, three
teachers, and two parents sit. Hunter, supra note 181, at 500. The councils make decisions
regarding curriculum, textbooks, staffing, discipline, and the budget. Id.
202 See Hunter, supra note 181, at 514-15.
203
NAT'L CTR.FOR EDUC.STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T EDUC., THE NAEP 1998 RtAiNc, RE.
PORT CAlm NATIONAL & STATE HIGHLIGHTS 14, available at http://nces.ed.gov/natilonsreportcard/pubs/mainl998/1999479.shtnl (reporting Kentucky as one of only five states in
which average reading scores among fourth graders in 1998 were significantly higher than
in 1992).
204 Hunter, supra note 181, at 515.
205
206

See id.

McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 553-54 (Mass,

1993).
207

MAss. ANN.LAis ch. 71 (Law. Co-op. 1996 & Supp. 2000).

208

See Kelly, supra note 119, at 410-14.
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is a leveling up approach, but with no ceiling on the amount of revenue wealthy districts can raise. 20 9 MERA created curriculum framework committees, assessment programs, and a governance structure
that shifts control and responsibility to local schools. 2 10 Threat of
sanction encourages schools to strive to meet state testing
21
standards. '
Indicators show early signs of success for Massachusetts's reform
efforts. In 1999, the Iowa Test of Basic Skills showed 31% of Massa-

chusetts third-graders in the "advanced
reader" category, up ten per2 12
centage points from the 1998 results.
C.

Common Critiques of Equity and Adequacy Reform

Both those who favor education reform generally as well as those
who oppose it have criticized equity-based reform. Some education
reformers point out that the drawback to equity reform is that strict
per-student spending threatens funding that enables districts to address special needs. For instance, urban schools with security needs,
schools with high numbers of special education students, and schools
with high numbers of non-English-speaking students simply have
higher per-pupil costs than other districts that do not get factored into
the state allocation formula.213 On the other side of the debate, some
critics of equity-based reform use it as a reason to oppose progressive
reform generally. They argue that equity-based remedies waste money
in low-income districts in which, according to the argument, students
do not benefit from expensive amenities and college preparatory programs. 2 14 Furthermore, opponents of general reform note that supporters of equity-based reform are unable to find evidence that
equalization of funding equalizes education, but argue instead that
factors such as levels of parent education, wealth, and involvement in

210

Id. at 412.
See id. at 412-13.

211

See id. at 413. Massachusetts also implemented a new statewide testing program

209

implementing a requirement that tenth graders must meet testing requirements in order
to graduate. See Memorandum from David P. Driscoll, Commissioner, to Members of the

Board of Education (Nov. 16, 1999), available at http://iiv.doe.mass.edu/mcas/
112399memo.html. The graduation requirement of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) has proved to be controversial. See Coco McCabe, SehoofsDebating
Impact of MCAS, BostoN GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2000, at 1. After 45% of tenth graders failed
English and 34% failed math on the 2000 test, the state board of education approved a
plan that would allow students at least five more chances to pass and to take retests that do
not include the hardest questions. Scott S. Greenberger & Corey Dulling, AIS Retest Plan
Approved, BosToN GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2001, at B4.
212 See Press Release, Mass. Dep't of Educ., Grade Three Iow Reading Test Results are
Released (July 20, 1999), available at http://www.doe.mass.edu/news/archives99/
072099g3r.html.
213 See McUsic, supra note 114, at 106.
214

See id.
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schools are more likely to have an impact than dollar figures on a
balance sheet.2 1 5 Finally, it is difficult for equity-based reform to escape the criticism that it will bring about the "dumbing-down" of pub216
lic schools.

In contrast, adequacy reform is often heralded as a more
thoughtful approach to education reform because it addresses not
only a system's inputs, but also uses assessment and accountability
measures to monitor a system's outputs. 2 17 Furthermore, adequacy reform is often less controversial because it poses a "less immediate"
threat to local control.2 18 However, not all reform proponents share
in the praise of adequacy reform. Adequacy reform is less likely to
result in absolute horizontal or vertical equity, as evidenced by the
experience of Texas, Kentucky, and Massachusetts. 2 19 Given the
seemingly arbitrary determinations of what constitutes "adequate,"
some critics advocate more objective measures of equality.2 20 In the
words of Justice Marshall, "the question of discrimination in educational quality must be deemed to be an objective one that looks to
what the State provides its children, not to what the children are able
22 1
to do with what they receive."
III
NEW HAMPSHIRE AND VERMONT'S EDUCATION FINANCE
REFoRM EFFORTS

A.

New Hampshire's Legislative Response to Claremont

As Claremont Hl's April 1, 1999, deadline approached, the New
Hampshire legislature considered alternative tax reform plans: one
raising revenue for education through a statewide property tax and
another generating the funds through a 4% income tax. 2 22 Both
plans proved controversial in the "Live Free or Die" state, which to
215
216
217

See id. at 107.
See id.
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 5, at 497.
218
d. at 495. Robinson means "less immediate" in the sense that adequacy reform
does not displace local control over finances, although it may result in state-mandated
school district performance standards.
219 See supra Part IA.4, B.1-2.
220 One critic cites the variety of adequacy definitions in court opinions as evidence of
the true arbitrariness of the concept: "To me, it is not at all self-evident why certain aspects
of an adequate education-such as sufficient knowledge of one's 'mental health'-are included within the courts' definitions, and others-such as sufficient exposure to those of
different backgrounds and cultures-are excluded." James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and
School FinanceLitigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 549 (1999).
221
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 84 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
222 Anand, supra note 95.
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date had no income, sales, or statewide property tax. - 3 Finally, on
April 29, 1999, almost a month past the deadline, the legislature enacted House Bill 117,224 an $825 million education spending plan,
most of which was to come from a statewide property tax of $6.60 per
$1000 equalized property value on both residential and utility prop-

erty.225 The plan required the state treasurer to deposit all revenue

collected in an education trust fund. 226 From this fund, the state
would pay "adequate education grants" 22 7 to districts with property tax

revenue below the "per pupil adequate education cost,"228 an amount

equal to the adequate education cost multiplied by the ADA in that
district. 229 Under the plan, districts that raised education property tax
revenue in excess of the adequate education grant for which they
were eligible under the formula would be liable to the state for that
amount.2 30 The legislature intended to phase in this liability over five

years.2 31 Furthermore, the legislature authorized districts to "develop
educational programs beyond those required for an adequate education and to raise and appropriate amounts necessary for such

programs."23 2
The New Hampshire Supreme Court weighed in on the constitutionality of the education finance plan in October of 1999.233 The
court declared unconstitutional the provisions creating the five-year
phase-in of statewide property tax liability for districts whose statewide
property tax revenue exceeded their adequate education grant allocation.2- 4 Property-wealthy districts continue to challenge the constitu223

Id.

224

See Act of April 29, 1999, 1999 N.H. Laws ch. 17.
N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 76:3 (Supp. 2000). The tax reform measure also consisted
of a business enterprise tax, Act of April 29, 1999, ch. 17, §21 (to be codified at N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 77-E:2), and a cigarette tax increase, id. ch. 17, § 23 (to be codified at N.H.
225

R:v. STAT. ANN. § 78:32).

226 Id. § 198:39 ("Moneys in such fund shall not be used for any purpose other than to
distribute adequate education grants to municipalities' school districts pursuant to RSA
198:42.").
227

Id.

228 Id. § 198:40. The formula determined per-pupil adequate education cost by multiplying the lowest per-pupil expenditure in districts where 40% to 60% of the elementary
school students enrolled achieved a score on statewide education assessment tests of basic
or above. Id. § 198:40(1) (b) (1).
229 Id. § 198:41 (I) (a). The formula also takes into account transportation costs and
education property tax warrants. Id. § 198:41 (I) (b)-(c). The average daily attendance is a
weighted figure which takes into account disabled students and students eligible for free or
reduced-price meals. 1tt § 198:40(11).
230 Id. § 198:46, amended by Act of June 6, 2000, 2000 N.H. Laws ch. 239, § 8 (to be
codified at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 198:46).

231

Id. § 198:46(IV).
Id § 198.43.
233
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 744 A.2d 1107 (N.H. 1999) ('Claremont V").
234 Claremont V, 744 A.2d at 1108. The court points out that, under the plan, in 1999
property-poor towns (for example, Claremont and Allenstow ) had to pay the $6.60 per
232
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tionality of the statewide property tax and some are withholding their
2
property tax liability to the state. 35
B. Vermont's Legislative Response to Brigham
1.

The Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1997 ('Act 60")

In June of 1997, the Vermont legislature responded to the Brigham decision by enacting the Equal Education Opportunity Act of
1997, colloquially known as "Act 60."236 The Act adopted as its underlying policy the notion that "all Vermont children will be afforded educational opportunities which are substantially equal although
educational programs may vary from district to district."23 7 This section will address Act 60's main components, which consist of: (a)
block grants from the state supported by a statewide property tax; (b)

measures to equalize local spending; and (c) provisions regarding assessment and accountability.
a. Block Grants and Equalized Local Spending

Act 60 requires the state to allocate block grants of $5000 per

"equalized" pupil in each school district.2 3 8 A variety of revenues support the block grant allocation, including revenue from a statewide
education property tax and local property tax revenues from school
$1000 property rate, while their property-rich counterparts (for example, Rye and
Moultonborough) had to pay less ($3.79 per $1000 and $3.18 per $1000, respectively). Id.
at 1109. The court denied that the phase-in constituted a legitimate partial abatement
because it did not limit tax relief to persons aggrieved by assessment of the tax. Id. Instead, the court found the plan was overinclusive in its favorable tax treatment to those not
in jeopardy of suffering economic hardship as a result of the new rate scheme. See id. at
1111.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court then rendered an advisory opinion calling a revised plan unconstitutional. Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing
System), No. 00-179, 2000 WL 1800528 (N.H. Dec. 7, 2000). The court emphasized that
any funding mechanism that relied on local funding to support the cost of an adequate
education-up to the baseline adequacy amount-would violate the state constitution's
education clause. Id at *2.
235
See Alton Voters Give Blessing to Tax Revolt, AssocUAEm Paxss, Jan. 17, 2000, available
at WL APWIRES 02:18:00; Carey Goldberg, A Tax Revolt Grows in New Hampshire: 'Donor
Towns'that PayMore Will ChallengeNew System in Cour4 N.Y. TIMs, Nov. 27, 1999, atA9; Ann
E. Marimow, Donor Towns Sue State: They Argue Taxation Method is Still Unfair, CONCORD
MONrroR, Dec. 23, 1999, at Al, A8.
236
Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1997, 1997 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 60 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 16 and 32 of VT. STAT. ANN.).
237 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1 (Supp. 2000),
238
See Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1997 § 24(a). $5000 is adjusted upward
from the fiscal year 1997 level based on an annual state index. In 1999 the block grant per
equalized pupil is $5377. SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4011. Use of "equalized pupil" results
in a weighted average daily membership, which takes into account economically deprived
pupils and pupils for whom English is a second language. I& § 4010(c), (d).
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districts with budgeted spending in excess of the amount receivable
under the state block grant calculation.2 39
b. EqualizationMeasures
Under Act 60, the education property tax is itself equalized, in
that it applies a rate of $1.10 per $100 of nonresidential property, but
makes certain sensitivity adjustments that take into consideration the
taxpayer's household income and the amount of the taxpayer's local

district property tax.240
Act 60 also enacted equalization of local education spending "so

that each school district will have substantially equal capacity to raise
and provide the same amount per pupil on the local tax base" by implementing a local share state education property Utax.2 4 1 Under the
statutory tax formula, a district is liable to the state for a percentage of
the funds it raises in local property taxes in excess of its state block
grant entitlement. 242 The Commissioner of Education sets this
"equalized yield amount" each year.2 4 3 For example, in fiscal year
1997, for every $42 above the $5000 block grant amount that a district
desired to spend per pupil, it was liable to the state for 1% of the
funds raised towards that amount. 244 Property-poor districts are eligi2 45
ble for the revenue collected in this way.
In summary, Act 60's effect on each district is determined by a
comparison of the amount receivable by the district from the state to
the amount the district must pay to the state in education property
taxes and local share state education property taxes. Amounts receivable from the state include the block grant allocation, other state allocations in nonblock form (such as for special education), property tax
reduction payments to qualified low income taxpayers, and funds
from the sharing pool for qualified property-poor tolins. 24 6 Qualified
239 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4025(a) (1)-(2). The education fund also includes revenue
from the state lottery, a portion of revenue from a meals, room, and alcohol tax, and a
portion of corporate income tax, among other sources. Id. § 4025(a) (4)-(6).
240 VT. STAT. A Ni. tit. 32, § 5402(a) (Supp. 2000); id. § 6066.
241
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4000(b); id. § 4011, amended Iy 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves No.

108.
242
243
244

Id. § 4025(a) (2).

Id. § 4027(a).
SeeVF.hoNr LFAGuE OF Crrs & TowNs, EDUCo.ON FIxcnE FEATuREs OF ACr 60,
as amended (1998), at http://wvv.act60.org/vlct_doc.htn. [hereinafter EDcAnoN- Fi.
NA1cE FEATums.
245 SeeVT. STAT.

246

ANN. tit. 16, § 4011(b), amended ly 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 103.
The activist group Concerned Vermonters for Equal Educational Opportunity pro-

vides an example of how Act 60 results in net gains for towns that must contribute to the
sharing fund. S e VFmuONRmS FOR EQu,L Euc. OPxo-rTNr; Aar 60: C,.LcmTuIxrx ITS
EFFECT oNYouR ToWvN(2000), at http://www.act60works.org/calc.html. The town of Norwich, in fiscal year 1999, is eligible for. $4 million in block grants, $600,000 in nonblock
grant funds, $600,000 in property tax reduction payments, and $0 from the sharing pool,
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property-poor local districts may offset property tax liability by raising
247
revenues through a sales tax.

c. Allocation of Responsibility for Assessment Between the Local
Districts and the State Board of Education

Act 60 reflects the mandate of the Brigham decision 248 in that it
attempts to establish both equal access to quality education and local
district control over education programs. 249 Act 60's allocation of responsibilities between the State Board of Education and the local
school districts incorporates both of these goals. Under Act 60, the
State Board of Education has the power to set standards, develop assessments, and issue statewide reports on school and student progress,
while the local school districts maintain responsibility for local action
2 50
plans, assessments, and accountability systems.
2.

ChallengingAct 60

In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld Act 60 against a
challenge brought by citizens from the property-rich, ski-resort town
of Stowe, who had created a plaintiff corporation. 251 After the expiration of Act 60's transition provisions in 2002, the town of Stowe, in
order to maintain its level of funding, stands to be liable to the state
for nearly 70% of its local property tax revenue in local state share
property taxes. 252 The plaintiff corporation argued that the Act's reliance on the discretion of voters in property-wealthy towns to supplement state funding for education is an unconstitutional delegation of
the state's legislative authority.253 The court rejected the plaintiffs
delegation doctrine claim 2 54 and further held that the plaintiff was

precluded from suing based on "predictions" about how the Act might
violate the constitution when and if the citizens of Stowe voted to pro55
vide additional funds beyond the block grant amount. 2
for a total of $5.2 million. Nonvich is liable for $3,700,000 in statewide education property
tax and a $500,000 contribution to the sharing pool, for a total of $4.2 million. The town's
net gain is $1 million, $600,000 more than the $400,000 in nonblock aid it would have
been eligible for without Act 60. Id.
247 SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §138(b) (1) (Supp. 2000). These districts may also raise
revenues through a 1% meals, alcoholic beverages, and rooms tax. See id. § 138(b) (2)-(3).
248 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4000(a).
249 Id. § 1.
250 See EDUCAUON FINANcE FEAruRS, supra note 244.
251
See Stowe Citizens for Responsible Gov't v. State, 730 A.2d 573, 574 (Vt. 1999).
252
253

Id. at 575.
Id. at 574.

254

Id. at 576 ("[A] statutory provision that does not take effect unless assented to by

the voters of a municipality 'is not invalid as a delegation of legislative power, provided tie
statute is complete in itself.'" (quoting 2 EUGENE
PORATONS § 4.10, at 30 (3d ed. 1994))).
255
Stowe Citizens, 730 A.2d at 576.
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Public Opinion and Proposed Legislative Changes

Act 60 has provoked outrage and concern among parents of Vermont schoolchildren residing in property-rich communities.2 56 Even
some communities that stand to benefit from the local share property
fund are concerned about the tax impact on businesses such as ski
resorts and factories that employ local citizens.25 7 Citizen groups on
both sides of this divisive issue have published detailed web sites. 2- s
Some towns have retaliated against Act 60 by refusing to pay the state
2 59
its local share liability.
As an alternative to Act 60, citizens and conservative lawmakers
have proposed the Education Revenue Sharing (ERS) plan, which
they contend meets Brigham's mandate for equalized educational opportunity without relying on either a statewide property tax or recapture provisions.2 6 0 ERS would replace the Act 60 equalized yield/
block grant system with a "local property tax for funding of education
and a new formula for distribution of state aid which is based on the
income level of the school district residents."2 6 ' Specifically, the state
would limit property tax liability and provide supplemental appropriations from the general fund to property-poor districts.2 62 This system,
however, would not address the discrepancies among districts' property tax bases. Property-poor districts would still be taxed at a disproportionately higher rate as compared to property-rich districts, which
could continue to raise more revenue with lower tax rates.

256

The most famous parent to criticize Act 60 is novelist John Irving of The World

According to Gayp fame. Irving called the legislature "Marxist[ ]" and predicted that "now
we will see those schools [in his property-rich district of Dorset] decimated." Amity Shlaes,
Vermont Levels Its Sdhoos, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1998, at A22.
257 See Shlaes, supranote 256, at A22.
258 For examples, see the pro-Act 60 Concerned Vermonters for Equal Education Opportunity website at http://www.act60works.org. and the anti-Act 60 Vermont League of
Cities and Towns website at http://ww%.act60.org.

259 The towns oflWhitingham, Searsburg, and Dover were the initial holdout communities that refused to pay their shares of Act 60 liability to the state. Last Three Towns Rebelling Against Act 60 Settle Up with Stat4 Apr. 10, 2000, available at WVL 4/10/00 APWIRES
15:24:00. Dover eventually paid voluntarily, but the attorney general had to sue Witingham and Searsburg-and a superior court judge had to freeze the two towns' bank
accounts--to elicit their shares of statewide property taxes. Id.One Vermont newspaper
reports yet another holdout-the state's smallest town of Victory. John Dillon, VIctoyr Fights
Vermont on School Tax Sharing, RurLn HERmLD, Nov. 5, 2000, http://rutlandherald.nybor.com/Archive/Artides/Article/15058.
260

See THm ALTFRNAT

s GRoup, EDuAION RzNuE SHAING: A SF.xSIBLE ALrF.zA-

TV TO Acr 60 (1999), at http//vw.act6O.org/sharing.htm [hereinafter Et:Gxro.N REVENUE SHRI~uNGJ.
261 H.B. 444, 65th Leg., Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1999).
262 The Bill was not carried over to the current legislative session. SceEoccnox REVE.
N'uE SHaRUG, supranote 260.
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IV
EVALUATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES OF
HAMPSHIRE AND VERMONT

NEw

Foregoing attempts at guaranteed yield and equalization of dis-

tricts' tax bases, 263 New Hampshire and Vermont legislators have
264
equalized property tax rates by imposing statewide property taxes.
New Hampshire's choice of this remedy is not surprising, given the
New Hampshire Supreme Court's holding in ClaremontIthat the legislature has a nondelegable duty to provide students with an adequate
education. 26 5 This stance led to the court's conclusion in Claremont II
that "'the taxes imposed by the legislature for support of schools...
are, in their nature, state taxes"' 26 6 and that therefore "the taxing dis-

trict is the State." 267 However, New Hampshire does not attempt to
recapture districts' local property tax revenue raised with the intent of
supplementing adequacy education grants, while Vermont has chosen

to make districts liable for a percentage of supplemental funds
raised. 268
A question faces legislators and voters in each state: Which system

will ensure educational adequacy for public school students while providing an equitable system of taxation? This section addresses the equity and adequacy of both states' remedies.
A. Equitability of the Remedies of New Hampshire and Vermont
Horizontal equity (equity in per-pupil expenditure among districts), vertical equity (sensitivity to districts with special needs), fiscal
neutrality (equity of yield for tax effort among districts), income sensitivity (sensitivity to taxpayers with low income levels), and extent of
equalization (equalization of nonprogrammatic expenditures such as
263

See discussion supra Part IIA.1. The Vermont Supreme Court specifically com-

mented on its then-existing "foundation formula" for distribution which was essentially a
guaranteed tax base:
From an equity standpoint, the major weakness of a foundation formula
distribution system is that it equalizes capacity only to a level of a minimally
adequate education program.... School districts with greater property
wealth, however, can more easily spend above foundation costs to improve
education, and the record before us shows that they usually make these
expenditures. Thus, a foundation-formula, state aid program can boost the
capacity of the poorest districts, but still leave substantial deficiencies in
overall equity.
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 388 (Vt. 1997) (citations omitted).
264 See supra Part III.
265 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) ("Claremont I").
266 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Vt. 1997) ("Claremont II")

(quoting Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. 565, 571 (1829) (alterations in the original),
267 I&
268

See supra Part III.
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plant and transportation costs) contribute to the overall equity of an
education reform system. The chart below summarizes the comparison of the reform efforts of New Hampshire and Vermont on these
factors.

Indicator

New Hampshire Reform
(HB117)

Vermont Reform (Act 60)

Horizontal Equity (equity in
per pupil expenditure
among districts)

Lack of substantial equity as
districts are free to generate
revenue from local property
taxes without liability to the
state.

Substantial equity achieved
by imposing liability on
wealthy districts for spending above the block grant
amount.

Vertical Equity (ensuring
that districts with special
needs have access to additional funds)

Adequacy grant calculated
Block grant is multiplied by
based on a weighted average a weighted averaged daily
daily attendance figure that membership in a district,
takes into account the num- which takes into account ecber of students who are dis- onomically disadvantaged
abled and economically dis- students (measured by eligiadvantaged (measured by el- bility for food stamps) and
igibility for free or reduced
English-as-a-second-language
lunch) in each district,

students.

Fiscal Neutrality (equity in
yield from tax effort among
districts)

Uniform statewide property
tax rate of $6.60 per $1000
property value. However, additional local property taxes
have no uniformity rate.

Uniform statewide property
tax rate of $1.10 per $100
property value. Additional
local property taxes may be
levied at nonuniform rate.

Income Sensitivity

None 269

Equalization of nonprogrammatic costs

Taxpayers with household
incomes less than $75,000
may pay the lesser of (a) 2%
of their income or (b) the
tax the municipality would
have assessed on property if
the value were reduced by
$15,000.270 Additional relief
is provided for taxpayers
uith household income of
less than $47,000.271
Cost of construction, transSpecial education funds are
portation, and special educa- distributed at the state level
tion are not included in the separate
2 2from block
state's base expenditure per grants. 7
pupil; therefore, these costs
are not equalized.

269

In fact, New Hampshire's constitution prohibits progressivity w-itfin any single tax.

See N.H. CoNsr. pt. 2, art. 5.

VT. STAT. ANN.tit. 32, § 6066(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2000).
271 See i& § 6066 (a)(3). Taxpayers iith annual household income between $25,000
and $47,000 are eligible for a property tax credit of 5%. Id Taxpayers with annual household income between $10,000 and $24,999 are eligible for a property tax credit of 4.5%.
Id. Taxpayers with annual household income between $5000 and $9999 are eligible for a
property tax credit of 4%. Id. Taxpayers with annual household income less than $5000
are eligible for a property tax credit of 3.5%. Id.
272 The state makes total expenditures in each fiscal year equal to 60% of the total
statewide special education expenditures not derived from federal sources. VT. STAT. A.N,.-.
tit. 16, § 2967(b) (Supp. 2000).

270
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1. New Hampshire and Vermont Attain Fiscal Neutrality
As the chart illustrates, the uniform property tax rate ensures the
fiscal neutrality of both states' tax systems. As a result, residents' property taxes are proportional to property value. Both states have required reassessment of property values according to statewide criteria
to ensure that the uniform rate is applied fairly to all property.2 73 If
property values are assessed too infrequently, the effects of the competing forces of appreciation and depreciation go undetected, result2 74
ing in distorted relative property values.
2.

Vermont Surpasses New Hampshire in Horizontal Equity and
Income Sensitivity

Both states' implementation of a statewide property tax creates a
distinction between "donor" towns and "receiver" towns. 2 75 Donor
districts have high property tax bases and therefore raise more than
their state entitlements by taxing at the uniform rate.2 76 Receiver
towns have smaller property tax bases, so their property tax revenue is
less than their state entitlements; the state supplements the difference
between the state entitlement and the property taxes raised. 277 Payment from donor towns to receiver towns is a step toward horizontal
equity that narrows the gap between what property-rich and propertypoor districts can afford to spend on education.
Vermont's system of taxation, with its limited recapture, 2 78 provides more horizontal equity than New Hampshire's system, which
does not limit districts in the amount of revenue they may raise to
273

See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 21-J:3 (XIII) (Supp. 1999) (imposing on the Commis-

sioner of the Department of Revenue Administration the duty to "[e]qualize annually by
March 31 the valuation of the property in the several towns, cities, and unincorporated

places in the state"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5405(a) (imposing on the commissioner of
taxes the duty to "determine the equalized education property tax grand list and coefficient of dispersion for each municipality in the state").
274 See Marcia A. Brown Thunberg, Raising Revenue for an Adequate Education in New
Hampshire,20 VT.L. REv. 1001, 1037-39 (1996). Thunberg explains that when "one home
is assessed at fair market value during a town's assessment and a second home, built a few
years later, is assessed at a value comparable to the first," relative property values are distorted because "[a]lthough the two homes have the same assessed value, the possible in-

crease or decrease in value of the first home is not recognized." Id. at 1307. Evidence of
Thunberg's characterization of the problems caused by infrequent assessment has been
uncovered as New Hampshire now attempts to correct for years of disparate assessment.
For instance, one report indicates that the city of Keene consistently undervalued its prop-

erty by 16% due to twenty-eight years of failing to conduct door-to-door property inspections. See Geeta O'Donnell Anand, Way of ValuingProperty in N.H. is Under Attack, WALL ST.
J.-NEw ENG., July 14, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5460195.
275 Lisa Shapiro et al., The Economic and FiscalImpact of a Statewide Property Tax in New
Hampshire, STATE TAX TODAY, Jun. 14, 1999, at 2, available at WL 1999 SIT 113-16.
276 See id.
277 See id.
278 See supra Part III.B.1 (b).
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supplement their adequacy grant.27 9 Also, Vermont's income-sensitivity provisions increase the equitability of its tax system. 280 Furthermore, Vermont includes more local costs in its equalization formula,
thereby ensuring that a district's designated financial needs include
28 1
such expenses as special education costs.

3. Both Vermont and New Hampshire Strive for Vertical Equity

Both states strive for vertical equity by accommodating expenses
for students with special needs when calculating the ADA for the purpose of determining each district's block grants. 28 2 It is difficult, however, to predict whether merely factoring special-needs students into
the ADA accurately reflects the additional funding needed to finance
the particularized programs that special-needs students require.
B. Adequacy of the Legislative Remedies of New Hampshire and
Vermont
New Hampshire relies on the New Hampshire Educational Improvement and Assessment Program (NHEIAP) tests as a measure of
"adequate" student performance when it calculates the cost of adequate education. 28 3 However, it does not provide incentives for districts to increase performance on assessment indicators. In order to
establish the cost of an adequate education in the state, it merely
looks at how much "adequately" performing schools are spending.2 m
Some critics assert that, because New Hampshire's per-pupil adequate
education cost worked out to only $4220, the plan does not raise
enough revenue to provide for adequate education in property-poor
districts. 28 5

In contrast, Vermont's local districts remain responsible for curriculum development, and its districts face penalties for failure to
meet state-determined adequacy standards. 28 6 In addition, the state
279
280
281

See Supra Part lll.A.
See supranotes 270-71 and accompanying text.
See supraPart HI.B.1 (b).

282

See supraPart II.A; Part lI.B.l(b).

283 H.B. 117, 1999 Gen. Ct., 156th Sess. (N.H. 1999). The legislature acknowledges
that "[t]here is no single, empirically correct method of establishing the cost of an ade-

quate education," but finds that "school districts that have 40 to 60 percent of students
scoring at or above the basic level on the NHEIAP tests are those districts that are meeting
the relevant outcome expectations and are providing an adequate education." Id. ch. 17,
§1Mv.
284 See supranote 283.
285 E.g., Question: Is New Hampshire RaisingEnough for School Spending?, WAu.. ST.J.-NEw
ENG., Aug. 11, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5464092.
286 For example, if a district fails to meet "quality standards" set forth by Act 60 (included measures of things such as reading proficiency, access to current technology, community support and early care) for two consecutive two-year assessment periods, the
Commissioner of Education may recommend technical assistance from the state, adjust-
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encourages local districts to be innovative and self-promoting. 287 Vermont's per-pupil state spending is $5282,288 unsurprisingly higher
than New Hampshire's because Vermont equalizes more of the costs
of education.
C.

Suggestions for Further Reform

1. GeneratingAdditional Funds
Successful education finance reform in New Hampshire and Vermont requires the generation of additional funds. 28 9 Prior to New
Hampshire's reform litigation, critics cited the underfunding of the
then-current program 290 as a primary cause of education inadequacy. 29 ' Therefore, it is unlikely that New Hampshire and Vermont
will improve the adequacy of the education they offer their students
unless they increase the amount of money dedicated to financing
education.
One indicator of adequacy is spending per pupil. 292 A national
comparison of per-pupil education spending (from both state and local sources) ranked New Hampshire thirty-third and Vermont fortyfifth for per-pupil expenditures. 293 Data from another source reflect
ment of the superintendent's responsibilities, state assumption of administrative control of
the district, or closing the school and requiring the district to pay tuition to another district. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 165(a)-(b) (Supp. 2000).
287 Districts may apply for up to $50,000 in "Challenge to Excellence" grants, awarded
for the financing of proposals to "promote quality education for all students within the
school" or "create educational opportunities for students" through "special classes and activities; mentorship; summer institutes on math, science, reading and language arts, social
studies, service, the arts or technology; partnerships for learning with businesses, post-secondary institutions and community organizations; tutorials; programs for at-risk or gifted
students; guidance, peer counseling, and career planning activities." Id. § 215(b) (2)-(3).
288 Act 60's transitional provisions set the block grant amount at $5000 per pupil, adjusted upward based on the "appropriate annual index for state and local government
purchased of goods and services." Id. § 4011 (transititional provision). In fiscal yeaer
1999, the adjusted amount was $5282. VERMONT LEAGUE OF CITIES AND TOWNS, EDUCAxrtON
FINANCE FEATURES OF Acr 60, AS AMENDED (July 15, 1998), available at http://Vww/
act60.org/vlctdoc.htm.
289 See John Augenblick, The Role of State Legislatures in School Finance Reform: Looking
Backward and Looking Ahead, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQurr. CRAnrING PRODUCrIvE
SCHOOLS IN A JUST Socimav 89, 95 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed., 1998). Augenblick lists several
factors as crucial to successful legislative remedies, including the stimulus of litigation,
availability of new funds, legislative leadership, efforts to inform the public, and reliance
on technical expertise. Id. at 94-97; see also Thunberg, supra note 274, at 1006-09 (describing recent studies finding correlation between economic resources and academic performance). But see Ryan, supra note 220, at 538-41 (downplaying the importance of monetary
remedies).
290 New Hampshire distributed Foundation Aid based on calculations using the
Augenblick formula. See supra note 69.
291 See Thunberg, supra note 274, at 1017; Interview with Andru Volinsky, supra note
67.
292 SeeJerald, supra note 171, at 65.
293 Id at 82 tbl.

2001]

685

A" FOR EFFORT

New Hampshire's willingness to increase total spending on education
at a faster rate than Vermont. 29 4 However, these increases take into
account both state and local district education expenditures. Consider the comparison between total per-pupil education expenditures
and each state's share of that amount. New Hampshire's adequacy
grant formula worked out to a guaranteed $4220 per pupil in 1999,- 9 5
while the per-pupil expenditures including local districts' expenditures is estimated at $7046 per pupil.296 Thus, the state of New Hampshire contributes only 60% of the cost of an adequate education,
which finds the state ranked only thirty-third nationally. -°g7 Vermont's
block grant per pupil in 1999 worked out to be $5282,29 compared to
its total per-pupil expenditure of $6680,299 making the state responsi294

See LENA K. McDowELU, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUc. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDLC.,

EARLY ESrImATES OF PuBuc ELEMET'ARY AND SEcocNDARY EcCADrTIO.

STATSMICS

SCHOOL

1998-99, at 3 tbl.1, 4 tbL2, 5 tbl.3, 6 tbl.4, 7 thL5 (1999). McDowell reported the fifty
states' total education expenditures and total student memberships for the fiscal years
1995 to 1999. Id. From this data, I calculated the total per-pupil expenditures and the rate
of increase from year to year. As the folwing chart illustrates, New Hampshire's percentage increase in total per-pupil education funding increased in the fiscal years following
Claremont 11; while Vermont shows no such trend following Brighang

YEAR

TABLE

Fiscal
Year
1995
1996
New
Hampshire 1997*

Vermont

*

2
Total Per-PupU
Expenditure
%
(Expenditure/
Increase
Membership)

Total Expenditures
(McDowell,
table 5)

Total Membership
(McDowell,
table 1)

$1,053,966,000

189,319

$5567

$1,114,540,000
$1,173,958,000

194,171
198,308

$5740
$5919

3%
8.8%
7.8%

3%

1998

$1,309,171,000

201,629

$6493

1999

$1,370,542,000

194,512

$7046

1995

$ 665,559,000

104,553

$6366

-

1996

$ 684,864,000

105,565

$6487

1.9%

1997**
1998

$ 718,092,000
$ 707,083,000

106,341
105,984

$6753
$6672

3.9%
-1.2%

1999

$ 704,331,000

105,442

$6630

0.1%

Claremont H decided.

** Brigham decided.
295 See supra note

228 (discussing New Hampshire's formula for determining adequacy
grant amounts); Geeta O'Donnell Anand, Claremonts Vkctory in School Suit Has Come ,ith a
Very High Price, WALL ST. J.-Nmv ENG., Dec. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 24923978
(reporting that the adequacy grant amount in fiscal year 1999 was $4220, "37%below the
average cost of educating a child in the state").
296 See supra note 294 thl.2.
See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
297
298
See supra note 288.
See supra note 294 thl.2.
299
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ble for 79% of the total per pupil expenditures-a total that is fortyfifth among all fifty states.3 0 0
For the states to guarantee higher spending per pupil, they must
expand their revenue sources. One study predicts that for the state to
fund the entire cost of adequate education in New Hampshire solely
through the statewide property tax, it would have to increase the rate
from $6.60 per $1000 to $15 per $1000.301 Economists believe that
increased reliance on statewide property taxes may have the unintended effect of deterring economic growth in both the business and
real estate sectors.30 2 Therefore, increasing or implementing other
broad-based taxes, such as an income tax or sales tax, politically unpopular as they may be, are preferable methods of generating additional revenue.

2. Improving Equity
Equity is not only a judicial mandate arising from the Claremont
and Brigham decisions, it is also a necessary public policy. Excessive
reliance on local school districts to fund education appears increas-

ingly misplaced given trends in American demographics. An increasing proportion of the population is elderly30 3 and the number of
families with school-age children is declining.3 0 4 These trends translate into fewer numbers of citizens willing to vote for education spending at a local level,3 0 5 which threatens to increase education funding
300
301

See supranote 293 and accompanying text.
See Shapiro et al., supra note 275, 1 15.
302 See id. Donor towns that raise local property taxes in an effort to compensate for
their statewvide property tax liability will deter economic growth of their local businesses.
See id. A stateide property tax disrupts the real estate market through capitalization,
which is "the general phenomenon whereby a stream of services or costs affects the value
of an asset." Id. 72. For example, higher taxes reduce property values, while proximity to
better schools increases property values. Shapiro and her coauthors predict that the market disruptions caused by capitalization will make it difficult for homeowners to access the
capital they need to purchase homes. Id. 117. This in turn will have a negative impact
on the real estate market and in turn may reduce the state's overall property tax base. Id. 1
118.
303 See U.S. CENsus BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF TiE
UNrrE STATES 1997, at 48 tbl.47 (117th ed. 1997) (reporting that the number of persons
aged sixty-five or older was 25.5 million in 1980, but is projected to increase to 34.7 million
in 2000).
304

See NAT'L CTRL FOR EDUC.

STATISTICS,

U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DiGEsr OF EDUCATION

STATISTICS 1996, at 25 tbl.17 (1997) (reporting that married-couple families with their own
children under 18 represented 41.9% of all families in 1980, 37.5% of all families in 1990,
and 36.6% of all families in 1994).
305 Robinson, supra note 5, at 509 ("An aging population is likely to be less concerned
about schools and more concerned about public goods that are important to them.")
Robinson points out that both public choice theory and empirical data support the disinclination of the elderly and families without school-age children to support public schools.
See id.
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disparities among communities. Thus, it is increasingly important to
equalize education funding at the state level.
Given the Vermont Supreme Court's explicit recognition of the
importance of equity in its education finance system,3 0 it is not surprising that the Vermont state legislature incorporated elements of
fiscal neutrality, horizontal equity, and vertical equity into its tax structure. 0 7 New Hampshire has only begun to foster tax equity by reducing reliance on local property taxes to fund education30'3 Research
indicates that both states have much to strive for in terms of equity.m
A national comparison of states' education spending patterns found a
17.5% differentiation in per-pupil expenditures among districts in
New Hampshire, the third highest percentage of all the states. 310 Vermont fared slightly better; its 16.2% differentiation placed it sixth
highest nationwide.3 1 ' While this study used pre-1998 data3 12 and
therefore does not reflect both states' most recent efforts to improve
equity among districts, it should signal to both states how far there still
is to go. Moreover, both states can increase horizontal equity by
equalizing more of the costs of education and limiting the extent to
which districts can raise additional funds.
3.

Texas-style Alternatives to Recapture

Though recapture has allowed Vermont to attain substantial equity, it is a politically unpopular device because school districts view
recapture of revenue as state encroachment on local control of public
schools. 3 13 In Texas, the legislature made the bitter pill of recapture
easier to swallow by giving districts the power to choose the means by
which they would support education statewide. 31 4 The Vermont legislature ought to consider alternative methods of inducing districts to
contribute a portion of the revenue raised above the block grant entitlement. Districts given the option to purchase attendance credits,
contract with students from other districts, submit commercial real
estate for attachment, or consolidate districts and/or property tax baSee Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997) ('Wile we recognize that equal
306
dollar resources do not necessarily translate equally in effect, there is no reasonable doubt
that substantial funding differences significantly affect opportunities to learn.... Money is
dearly not the only variable affecting educational opportunity, but it is one that government can effectively equalize.").
See supra Part III.B.
307
308 See supra Part I.A.
309 See supra Part IV.A.
310 SeeJerald, supra note 171, at 67 thl.
311

See i&L

312
313
314

See j&
See Edwards, supra note 16, at 34.
See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 151, at 679.
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ses might more readily accept their obligation to contribute to statewide education.3 15
4. IncreasingReliance on Performance Indicators
Had New Hampshire's legislative reform paralleled the reform
acts of Kentucky and Massachusetts in the same way that Claremont
paralleled Rose and McDuffy,3 16 New Hampshire also would have implemented the strong accountability measures now considered a key
to successful education reform.3 17 As noted above, assessment indicators demonstrate improvement in Kentucky and Massachusetts school
systems.3 1 8 Other states, like Texas, have also implemented strong accountability measures, and these states document improving scores on
national indicators. 3 19 Education Week magazine, in its yearly "Quality
Counts" issue, reports that Kentucky and Texas are among the "handful" of states whose students have consistently improved their reading
and mathematics scores on the National Assessment of Educational
Progress, due in large part to their comprehensive legislative reform,
including accountability measures.3 2 0 It is thus imperative that New
Hampshire follow the lead of Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Texas, as
well as its neighbor Vermont, by holding school districts accountable
for the success of their students on performance indicators, either
through systems of rewards or sanctions.
5. EarmarkingState Fundsfor Education
The potential downside of shifting education funding from local
to state sources is a diminished incentive for local taxpayers to invest
in education.3 2' Taxpayers with school-aged children have obvious incentives to vote for higher property tax rates under uncapped, unequalized property-tax-based education finance systems.3 22 Taxpayers
315

See id

See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) ("Claremont I").
316

317

See, e.g., Kelly, supranote 119, at 408 ("KERA appropriately includes two accounta.

bility mechanisms that encourage substantive change."); id. at 412-13 (heralding MERA's
assessment programs and school accountability for students' performance as "capable of
improving the quality of education in poor districts").
318
See supra Part II.B.1-2.
319 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
320
SeeJerald, supra note 171, at 62. Jerald includes Kentucky and Texas in a small list
of states that he considers to be "pace-setters in education policy," and notes that they
"consequently also score near the top on the Quality Counts indicators." Id Attributing one
measure of success to specific accountability measures, Jerald goes on to discuss Texas's
minority student success in testing: "That kind of progress [does not] happen by accident.
Texas remains the only state to hold schools accountable for helping poor and minority
students meet the same achievement benchmarks as their peers." Id
321
See McUsic, supra note 114, at 112.
322
See id at 113.
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without school-aged children also have similar incentives because
their property value increases with the quality of the local schools.32At the state level, the education lobby depends on these kinds of incentives for its strength and its ability to defeat competing special interest groups.3 24 This problem is particularly threatening in New
Hampshire and Vermont for two reasons. First, both states have historically been unresponsive to the education lobby regarding state appropriations for the state university systems.-3 Another is the strong
"anti-tax sentiments" in both states, especially New Hampshire,3 2 6

which compel state legislators to sacrifice education funds for tax
3 2 7

cuts.

To compensate for this potential problem, New Hampshire and
Vermont should ensure that revenue generated in pursuit of equalizing education is earmarked for education. Both states should propose
and ratify constitutional amendments to that effect. The New Hampshire state legislature has considered, but not yet adopted, a constitutional amendment that would invest the revenue generated from its
statewide property tax in an education trust fund and restrict its use to
the financing of public education.3 28 Provisions of this kind would
serve to protect education revenue from competing special interests
and ensure the long-term success of education reform.
CONCLUSION

State legislatures attempting to comply with state supreme court
mandates to reform their education finance systems should strive to
meet the demands of both adequacy and equity. Reform efforts in
New Hampshire and Vermont demonstrate the potential for a dual
response: while Clarenont relied on the state education clause and
Brigham relied on the state equal protection clause, both state legislatures have incorporated elements of adequacy and equity into their
systems. The experiences of these two states suggest that regardless of
the catalyst for reform, education reform can and should include elements of both equity and adequacy.
323

See id.

324
325

New Hampshire ranks forty-ninth and Vermont fiftieth in the nation for higher

See id.

education funding. Peter Schmidt, As Economy Chugs Along, States PourMoney into Higher
Education, CHRON. OF HIGHER Enuc., Dec. 17, 1999, at http://chronide.com/govermenL

326

New Hampshire has neither an income tax, nor a sales tax and instead relies on

"sin taxes on liquor and cigarettes, room and meals taxes, gasoline taxes, and business
profits taxes. See Thunberg, supra note 274, at 1013. Only one other state, Alaska, has
neither a sales tax nor an income tax. See Norma Love, LegislatureAppres School Financing

Compomise, Assoc:-rm PaRss, Apr. 29, 1999, available at WI
327 See McUsic, supra note 114, at 113.
328

APWIRES 16:09:00.

See Constitutional Amendment Con. Res. 10, 156th Leg. (N.H. 1999).
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States like New Hampshire and Vermont, which meet their respective supreme court mandates by implementing an equalized statewide property tax rate, impose a measure worthy of replication
because statewide property taxes ensure the fiscal neutrality, or proportional effort, of state taxpayers. However, from a policy standpoint, New Hampshire and Vermont demonstrate that states
implementing such measures must strive to ensure horizontal equity
and reduce the discrepancies between total per-pupil expenditures
among districts. It is no longer constitutionally or politically acceptable for a state to delegate the lion's share of its responsibility to provide education to local districts that vary in ability and willingness to
finance education.
Whether a state is in the initial stages of implementing courtmandated reform, or whether it has been in the process for decades,
modem reform should incorporate the lessons of the last thirty years
of reform efforts in sister states. For instance, as Texas's reform demonstrates, recapture is not the only way to ensure horizontal equity
and reduce funding disparities among school districts. States like New
Hampshire and Vermont, or those looking to their experiences for
guidance, should experiment with district consolidation, attachment,
attendance credits, and contracting with students from other districts.
They should also take steps to alleviate "local control" issues by allowing districts to choose the method by which they will contribute to
equalized state education funds.
As for adequacy, increasing state-guaranteed per-pupil expenditures is one way to ensure that schools have access to the funds they
need to retain quality teachers, implement curriculum reform and accountability measures like those of Kentucky and Massachusetts, construct and maintain schools, and meet the expenses of students with
special needs. Generating additional funds in the form of new or increased taxes, as well as earmarking those funds raised for education,
are also necessary reform measures. Furthermore, to ensure efficient
use of funds, states with systems like New Hampshire's should hold
districts accountable for the success of their students.
States have always regarded education as an essential component
of a successful democratic system of government.3 29 However, in most
states, it took judicial efforts to catalyze legislative reform efforts and
encourage legislators to reiterate their states' commitment to education. Though most states required judicial efforts to catalyze legislative reform and encourage legislators to reiterate their states'
commitment to education, successful reform requires state legislatures' continued dedication. If New Hampshire and Vermont are, in
329 State constitutions' education clauses demonstrate the importance of education.
See supra notes 49-54.
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Governor Shaheen's words, "guided by common sense and dedication
to our children's futures,"3 30 they can ensure that their initial measures of reform are not the final steps towards serving quality educa-

tion for all students of both states, and that over time New Hampshire

and Vermont will emerge as models for education reform in other
states.

330

1998).

New Hampshire Governor Jeanne Shaheen, State of the State Address (Jan. 7,

